Section 4. Outcomes for children 4.14 In addition, across the estate we found several children who were informally separated without management oversight. This was typically due to the imposition of aspects of the local behaviour management schemes. In particular, when a child lost association at an adjudication or was placed on the lowest level of the incentives scheme17 while they were also receiving outreach education,18 they were effectively separated but without the same level of oversight or safeguards. 4.15 At Werrington, most children held on rule 58 were moved to the designated segregation unit (WADE) where correct authorisations always took place. However, the separation of those who remained on the wings was not always authorised and they were not always seen by a health care professional. Staff were confused about what should happen when children were separated on the wing. We found that officers and supervising officers were effectively authorising separation of children due to their behaviour. This separation could last for an extended period as the decision to continue it was taken daily, depending on the child’s behaviour at the point of unlock. 4.16 Rule 49 was also used to manage children who self-isolated, those who kept themselves away from other children and disengaged from the regime and education. In most cases we found this occurred within 72 hours of their isolation being noticed. 4.17 In all the YOIs we found examples of cursory reasons for separation, such as ‘for your safety’ or ‘staff assault’. In some cases, the reason was not completed and managers assumed the previous authorising paperwork would suffice. 4.18 When a health care professional does not agree with the proposed separation or continued separation at a subsequent review (see paragraph 4.12), the authorising manager must complete a decision log and inform the governor if separation is to commence or continue. We found that medical risk assessments were only completed if the separation was authorised; we came across no instances where a health care professional concluded that separation was unsafe. 4.19 After 21 days, the authorisation to continue the separation of a child moves outside the establishment and must be made by the prison group director (PGD), the manager responsible for several establishments. In cases of extended separation, the PGD needs to give authorisation for each subsequent 21-day period. We found that there were occasions where this authorisation had not been acquired and children continued to be separated without it. In one case at Feltham, a child had been separated for 54 days at the point of our inspection, but this had not been approved by the PGD since the second 21-day point; this meant that he had been segregated for 12 days with no authorisation. 4.20 On several occasions the PGD returned the 21-day authorisation late, which meant that some children spent a considerable time separated without authorisation. This was a significant failure of a high-level safeguard. 4.21 Between 1 May 2018 and 30 April 2019, local managers had asked the PGD for 21-day authorisations on 346 occasions. This figure includes children who needed further authorisations at 42, 63 and 84 days. The only YOI not to have requested authorisation to separate a child for longer than 21 days was Parc. None of the 346 requests to separate a child for longer than 21 days had been rejected. 4.22 These PGD authorisations appeared to have become routine and did not provide the highlevel oversight required to safeguard children from the harm of prolonged separation. As 17 18 As a result of poor behaviour; the incentives scheme is a progression method to reward good behaviour. Education provided to individuals or small groups of children on the wing rather than in education classrooms. Separation of children in young offender institutions 25