CRPD/C/18/D/28/2015 B. Committee’s consideration of admissibility 10.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must, in accordance with article 2 of the Optional Protocol and rule 65 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 10.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 2 (c) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter has not already been examined by the Committee, and has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 10.3 The Committee notes the author’s claim that, by deporting the family to Nigeria, the State party would violate his son’s rights under articles 7, 12, 15, 24, 25, 26 and 28 of the Convention, as he would not have access to adequate health care, education, habilitation and rehabilitation, standard of living and social protection in Nigeria. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the Committee lacks jurisdiction to consider these claims under the Optional Protocol, as the State party cannot be held responsible for violations of the Convention that are likely to be committed by another State outside Swedish territory and jurisdiction. The Committee notes that, under article 1 of the Optional Protocol, States parties recognize the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State party of the provisions of the Convention. The Committee is of the view that the removal by a State party of an individual to a jurisdiction where he or she would risk facing violations of the Convention may, under certain circumstances, engage the responsibility of the removing State under the Convention which has no territorial restriction clause. The Committee therefore considers that the principle of extraterritorial effect would not prevent it from examining the present communication under article 1 of the Optional Protocol. 10.4 The Committee, however, notes the State party’s argument that the expulsion order of 13 November 2012 became statute-barred on 13 November 2016 and is consequently no longer enforceable. The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the author and his family have the possibility of reapplying for residence permits before the Migration Agency, with subsequent possibilities of appeals before the Migration Court and the Migration Court of Appeal. The Committee further notes the State party’s argument that the complaint should be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione personae with the Convention, under article 1 of the Optional Protocol, or alternatively that it should be declared inadmissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Committee also notes the author’s argument that, at the time that he submitted the communication, the State party was in violation of the Convention and that the admissibility of the complaint should therefore be determined on the basis of the facts that were available at the time of the submission of the communication. 10.5 The Committee notes the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture, 13 which concerned the deportation of the complainants to their country of origin in cases where, as in the present communication, the expulsion orders against the complainants had become statute-barred at the time of the examination by that Committee. The Committee against Torture found the complaints to be inadmissible owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as the decisions to expel the complainants had become statute-barred, they were therefore no longer at risk of being expelled from the State party, they had the possibility of submitting new asylum applications, which would be examined in full by the migration authorities and there was nothing to indicate that the new procedure would be ineffective in the complainants’ case. The Committee also notes the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights14 concerning cases in which expulsion orders against the applicants had become statute-barred. The Court noted that, as the expulsion orders had become statutebarred, they could no longer be enforced. It also noted that the applicants could institute 13 14 12 See B.M.S. v. Sweden, S.K. and R.K. v. Sweden, A.R. v. Sweden, and J.M.U.M. v. Sweden. See European Court of Human Rights, Atayeva and Burman v. Sweden, application No.17471/11, decision of 19 February 2013; P.Z. and others v. Sweden, application No. 68194/10, judgment of 18 December 2012; and B.Z. v. Sweden, application No. 74352/11, judgment of 18 December 2012.