CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 to appropriate information and medical care in Ireland, the Court does not consider that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well-being reasons, based as it is on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life … and as to the consequent protection to be accorded to the right to life of the unborn, exceeds the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the Irish State. In such circumstances, the Court finds that the impugned prohibition in Ireland struck a fair balance between the right of the first and second applicants to respect for their private lives and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn.” The balance to be achieved has been considered by the Irish electorate on numerous occasions. 4.11 In K.L. v. Peru and L.M.R. v. Argentina, where the Committee found violations of article 17, legislation existed which allowed for the therapeutic termination of a pregnancy. The authors were initially told that they qualified for a termination, but that was then arbitrarily interfered with and not protected by the States in question. In the present case, no such conflict arose, as the hospital gave its clear opinion that a termination of pregnancy would not be available in Ireland. Therefore, the arbitrary interference which occurred in those cases did not occur in the present communication. Claims under article 19 4.12 Sufficient information has not been produced to substantiate the claims. Certain unsubstantiated allegations are made by the author, for example in relation to the midwife. By claiming that the midwife “refused to discuss” options she suggests an intention on the part of the midwife, without any further information being put before the Committee. In referring the author to the appropriate organization from which she could obtain the information she required, the midwife was not engaged in censorship, Nor was there a violation of article 19 in circumstances where the referral allowed the author to receive all information permissible, in fulfilment of article 19 (2). Therefore, in circumstances where the hospital gave advice to the author to see a counsellor, which referral led to a discussion of all the available options, there was no violation of article 19. Further, the crisis pregnancy programme of the Health Service Executive provides a rich resource of information available to the public at large in relation to crisis pregnancy and abortion. This resource is free of charge and was available to the author. Claims under articles 2 (1), 3 and 26 4.13 The State party contends that there has been no discrimination, but that if there has, it should be regarded as a reasonable and objective differentiation to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant. There can be no “invidious discrimination” in relation to a pregnant woman, as her physical capacity or circumstances in a state of pregnancy are inherently different to that of a man. That differentiation is a matter of fact and can only be accepted as axiomatic. 4.14 There is no basis for considering that the legal framework complained of, article 40.3.3 of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the 1861 Offences against the Person Act, discriminate against women on grounds of sex. The framework is gender neutral. If a man procures or carries out an abortion in circumstances not contemplated by the Constitution, he may be guilty of an offence. Even if the legal framework did discriminate on grounds of gender, any such discrimination would be in pursuit of the legitimate aim of protecting the fetus and be proportionate to that aim. The measures at issue are not disproportionate, as they strike a fair balance between the rights and freedoms of the individual and the general interest. Again in this area, in accordance with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, the State party enjoys a margin of appreciation. Therefore, the differentiation is reasonable and objective and achieves a legitimate end. 11