CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 5.5 The author rejects the State party’s categorization of the facts as excluding State conduct that could contravene the prohibition of ill-treatment. Her medical team, who were public employees, failed to provide her with the abortion she sought. She was denied an abortion by agents of the State, acting in accordance with State laws and policies. That caused the author severe mental anguish. Her pain and suffering reached the threshold required by article 7. Claims under article 17 5.6 The State party’s denial of access to abortion constitutes an arbitrary interference in the author’s exercise of her right to privacy for the following reasons: (a) The interference discriminated against her because she was woman, thereby contravening the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex enshrined in articles 2 and 3 of the Covenant; (b) The interference was not necessary or proportionate to a legitimate aim. The State party has not presented arguments specific to the author’s circumstances that would demonstrate the necessity and proportionality of its conduct towards her. (c) The State party failed to demonstrate that its interference with her right to privacy was necessary for achieving the legitimate aim invoked. As indicated above, the State party’s characterization of the “profound moral choices” of the Irish people is misrepresentative of the views of a majority of the Irish people; (d) The State party has failed to demonstrate that its interference in the author’s right to privacy was appropriate or effective in achieving its aim. A criminal legal regime, which prohibits women in all circumstances from obtaining an abortion in the jurisdiction, except where there is a real and substantial risk to their lives, and threatens them with significant prison terms in the name of protecting alleged moral choices concerning “the right to life of the unborn”, yet simultaneously includes an explicit provision providing for a right to travel out of the State to obtain an abortion is not a means to an end. Rather, it is a contradiction in terms and calls into question the genuine nature of the State party’s claims; (e) The State party has failed to demonstrate that the interference was proportionate. The trauma and stigma the author endured as a result of the attack on her physical and psychological integrity, dignity and autonomy combined to give rise to serious mental pain and suffering. In that context, the State party’s laws cannot be described as proportionate or as achieving a careful “balance of competing rights as between the unborn child and its mother”. Instead, the State party prioritized its interest in protecting “the unborn” and offered no protection to the author’s right to privacy. In fact, the author could have faced a severe criminal sentence had she obtained an abortion in Ireland. 5.7 The margin of appreciation doctrine invoked by the State party applies exclusively to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and has not been accepted by any other international or regional human rights mechanisms. Furthermore, the Court has never considered the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine to a set of facts similar to those experienced by the author. Claims under article 19 5.8 The Abortion Information Act can be described as a system of strict State control governing the manner in which information must be given. Doctors are barred from referring their patients to an abortion provider abroad and failure to comply with the requirements of the Act is an offence and subject to a fine. As a result, the right to information is not treated as a positive right, the realization of which is in the public good and requires action by the State to remove barriers to its exercise. The punitive framework in operation in the State party, resulting from the broad criminalization of abortion and the 13