CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 Annex II Individual opinion of Committee member Sarah Cleveland (concurring) 1. I concur in the Committee’s Views in this case. I also agree with the separate opinion of my colleagues that the Committee should have found a violation of article 19 of the Covenant and articulated a comprehensive finding of gender discrimination under articles 2(1), 3 and 26. I write separately to set forth my views on the finding of a violation of article 26. 2. In paragraphs 7.10 and 7.11, the Committee notes the disproportionate socioeconomic burdens that the Irish legal system imposes on women who decide not to carry a fetus to term, including those imposed on the author in particular. It also notes the author’s claim that Ireland’s criminalization of abortion discriminatorily subjected her to genderbased stereotypes. The Committee concludes that the distinctions drawn by the State party “failed to adequately take into account her medical needs and socio-economic circumstances and did not meet the requirements of reasonableness, objectivity and legitimacy of purpose” under article 26. The Committee thus identifies two prohibited grounds for finding a violation of article 26: discrimination on grounds of socio-economic status and gender discrimination. 3. With respect to socio-economic status, the Committee previously has expressed specific concern in relation to article 26 regarding the highly restrictive Irish legal regime, which requires women to travel to a foreign jurisdiction to obtain a lawful termination of pregnancy in most contexts, and the resulting “discriminatory impact of the Protection of a Life During Pregnancy Act on women who are unable to travel abroad to seek abortions” . Article 26, of course, “guarantee[s] to all persons equal and effective protection against b discrimination” on the grounds of both “property” and “other status.” It therefore prohibits the unequal access to reproductive health care for low-income and vulnerable populations that results from Ireland’s legal restrictions on reproductive health services. 4. The author further contends that Ireland’s criminalization of abortion stereotyped her as a reproductive instrument and thus subjected her to discrimination. She explains that by prioritizing protection of the “unborn” over a woman’s health and personal autonomy, Ireland subjected her to a gender-based stereotype that women should continue their pregnancies regardless of circumstances, because their primary role is to be mothers and caregivers, thus infringing on her right to gender equality. In particular, the author contends that Ireland’s differential treatment of women who decide to carry a pregnancy with a fatal a b 20 CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4, concluding observations adopted by the Committee at its 111th session (7-25 July 2014), para. 9. See also E/C.12/IRL/CO/3, CESCR, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Ireland (July 2015), para. 30 (expressing concern at “the discriminatory impact on women who cannot afford to obtain an abortion abroad or access to the necessary information”). Cf. Communication No. 1306/04, Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland (Views adopted 24 Oct. 2007), para. 10.3 (distinction between groups of fishermen was “based on grounds equivalent to property” under article 26); CESCR General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009), para. 35 (recognizing “other status” as including differential treatment on grounds of economic and social situation, which can lead to unequal access to health care services). Cf. Artavia Murillo, et al. v. Costa Rica, IACHR (2012), paras. 303-304 (ban on in vitro fertilization discriminated against persons who lacked financial resources to seek IVF treatment abroad).