CAT/C/71/D/792/2016 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to Uganda. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of the determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.14 8.4 The Committee recalls that the non-refoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group that may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. 15 The Committee also recalls that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”.16 Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: (a) the political affiliation or political activities of the complainant and/or the complainant’s family members; (b) the complainant’s sexual orientation; and (c) the risk of a female complainant being subjected to gender-based violence, including rape.17 8.5 The Committee recalls that the burden of proof is upon the author of the communication, who must present an arguable case, that is, submit substantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real. However, when complainants are unable to elaborate on their case, such as when they have demonstrated that they are unable to obtain documentation relating to their allegations of torture or have been deprived of their liberty, the burden of proof is reversed and the State party concerned must investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the complaint is based.18 8.6 The Committee notes the complainant’s argument that she would be exposed to a real, personal and present risk of torture if returned to Uganda in the light of the generalized illtreatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Uganda, her high profile and activism in organizations advocating the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Denmark and the fact that, in the past, she was subjected to “corrective rape” because of her sexual orientation. The Committee also notes the complainant’s argument that the Danish authorities did not give sufficient consideration to the additional risks she was facing following the publication of an online article featuring her name and photograph. 8.7 The Committee further notes the State party’s observations that the complainant’s personal circumstances, including the media article disclosing her name and photograph, have been thoroughly examined by the domestic authorities, taking into account the general human rights situation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Uganda. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the domestic authorities took into account the complainant’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and accepted the account of the facts she gave to the asylum authorities despite inconsistencies and unlikely elements in her statements. The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that some statements submitted in the complainant’s communication to the Committee do not 14 15 16 17 18 10 See, for example, E.T. v. the Netherlands (CAT/C/65/D/801/2017), para. 7.3; and Y.G. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/65/D/822/2017), para. 7.3. General comment No. 4 (2017), para. 11. Ibid., para. 11. Ibid., para. 45. Ibid., para. 38.