CAT/C/71/D/792/2016 examined by the domestic authorities and because the complainant has failed to substantiate the claim that there is a personal risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to article 3 of the Convention upon her return to Uganda. 7.4 The Committee considers, however, that the complainant’s claim that she risks being subjected to ill-treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention on account of her sexual orientation has been sufficiently substantiated for the purpose of admissibility. 7.5 As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the communication submitted under article 3 of the Convention admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 8.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the forced removal of the complainant to Uganda would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (refouler) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.13 13 For jurisprudence on non-refoulement claims of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons facing removal to Uganda, see; J.K. v. Canada, in which the Committee found a violation of article 3 in view of the author’s sexual orientation, his militancy in organizations advocating the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and the fact that he could be detained pursuant to criminal charges brought against him; and Nakawunde v. Canada (CAT/C/64/D/615/2014), in which the Committee found the communication inadmissible due to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. For jurisprudence related to non-refoulement claims of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, see: H.R.E.S v. Switzerland (CAT/C/64/D/783/2016), in which the Committee did not find a violation of article 3 in the event of the complainant’s return to the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite the fact that homosexuality is generally prohibited in the country, because the complainant did not claim that the Iranian authorities were aware of his sexual orientation or that he would express his homosexuality in the public sphere; and Mondal v. Sweden (CAT/C/46/D/338/2008), in which the Committee found a violation of article 3 in the event of the complainant’s expulsion to Bangladesh in view of his past experience of torture, his former political activities and the risk of persecution on the basis of his homosexuality combined with the fact that he belongs to a minority Hindu group. For jurisprudence of other treaty bodies, see Human Rights Committee, X. v. Sweden, (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), in which the Committee found a violation of articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the State party’s authorities focused mainly on credibility in the author’s account of facts and insufficient weight was given to the author’s allegations of the real risk he might face in Afghanistan in view of his sexual orientation; Human Rights Committee, M.K.H. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/117/D/2462/2014), in which the Committee found a violation of article 7 of the Covenant because of the arbitrary examination of the complainant’s claims, inter alia, as regards the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Bangladesh; Human Rights Committee, M.I. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/108/D/2149/2012), in which the Committee found a violation of article 7 of the Covenant because of the authorities’ failure to take into due consideration the author’s allegations regarding the events she experienced in Bangladesh because of her sexual orientation – in particular, her mistreatment by the police – in assessing the alleged risk she would face if returned to her country of origin; Human Rights Committee, W.K. v. Canada, (CCPR/C/122/D/2292/2013), in which the Committee did not find a violation of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant in the event of the complainant’s return to Egypt, notwithstanding serious human rights abuses committed against homosexuals in Egypt, because the author did not provide any specific argument that would lead to the conclusion that he would be at a real and personal risk if he were to return and because the applications filed and the arguments submitted by the author were thoroughly examined by the State party’s authorities; and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, A.S. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/69/D/80/2015), in which the Committee found the communication inadmissible owing to lack of substantiation and to the absence of evidence demonstrating that the authorities gave insufficient consideration to the author’s application for asylum, or that, in the examination of her case, there was any procedural defect or arbitrariness. 9