CAT/C/39/D/297/2006 page 14 10.3 The Committee also takes note of the complainant’s argument that, in the decision of 11 May 2006, the Minister’s delegate did not take into account the complainant’s particular situation, and in denying protection merely cited a supposed improvement in the general conditions in the Punjab. The State party replied to this argument by stating that it is not for the Committee to conduct a judicial review of the decisions of the Canadian courts, and that the Committee should not substitute its own findings for those of the Minister’s delegate, except in case of manifest error, abuse of process, bad faith, bias or serious procedural irregularities. The Committee recalls that, while it gives considerable weight to the findings of fact of the State party’s bodies, it is entitled to freely assess the facts of each case.12 In this case, the Committee notes that, in her protection decision of 11 May 2006, the Minister’s delegate denied the real, personal threat of torture based on the fresh assessment, and merely accepted that a new law had been adopted in India apparently protecting accused persons from torture, without regard to whether the law would effectively be implemented or how it would affect the complainant’s specific situation. 10.4 As for the Canadian authorities’ use of evidence that for security reasons was not divulged to the complainant, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that this practice is authorized by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and that in any event such evidence did not serve as a basis for the decision by the Minister’s delegate, as she did not consider the threat the complainant posed to Canadian security in her assessment of the risks. However, the Committee notes that, in both her decisions, the delegate considered the threat to national security. 10.5 On the basis of the above, the Committee considers that the complainant did not enjoy the necessary guarantees in the pre-removal procedure. The State party is obliged, in determining whether there is a risk of torture under article 3, to give a fair hearing to persons subject to expulsion orders. 10.6 As to the risk of torture at the time the complainant was removed, the Committee must determine whether, in sending the complainant back to India, the State party failed to meet its obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or return anyone to another State where there are substantial reasons for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In order to determine whether, at the time of removal, there were substantial reasons for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if he was returned to India, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim of the determination, however, is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which they were returned. 10.7 The Committee recalls its general comment on the implementation of article 3, in which it states that the risk of torture “must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable” (A/53/44, annex IX, para. 6). 12 See Dadar v. Canada, communication No. 258/2004, Views of 23 November 2005, para. 8.8.