CAT/C/39/D/297/2006 page 6 persons from abuses that had been tolerated under the old law.3 On that basis she had determined that the complainant would run no risk of torture if he was returned to India. She also determined that the complainant posed a threat to national security. The request for protection was therefore denied. The complaint 3.1 The complainant alleges a violation of article 3 of the Convention. He argues that the 2 December 2003 decision denying him protection was taken on the basis of irrelevant criteria such as the nature and gravity of past actions and the threat he posed to Canada’s security, and that it violates the Convention, which allows for no exceptions with respect to return to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. He recalls that, where it is shown that the person would be in danger of torture, it is against the principles proclaimed by the Convention to use irrelevant considerations to justify the denial of protection.4 He argues that, in the 11 May 2006 decision on protection, the Minister’s delegate again applied irrelevant considerations to justify the denial of protection to the applicant, in violation of the Convention and of international law. He also claims that the evidence in the case file shows beyond a doubt that there was a risk of torture if he was returned to India, as established in the three decisions preceding the 11 May 2006 denial of protection. 3.2 The complainant claims that the Minister’s delegate had put him in even greater danger in her 11 May 2006 decision by attributing to him crimes he had not personally committed. Furthermore, there were several errors in the decision, for the Minister’s delegate had failed to take account of the documents showing that torture was practised in India. According to these documents, torture was commonly used as an interrogation technique and the police were trained in its use, employing sophisticated methods that did not leave visible traces. The complainant argues that, rather than assessing the risk of the police using torture, the Minister’s delegate merely asserted that the worst problems in Punjab were rural employment and the lack of food industries. He also points out that the delegate’s claim that conditions in Punjab had improved overall in no way proved that a person believed to be a high-profile member of BKI would not be tortured. The delegate had also failed to address his specific situation. She ultimately had rejected out of hand the objective evidence such as Amnesty International’s January 2003 report showing that, notwithstanding the legislative reform intended to stamp out torture, Punjab’s judicial system remained most unsatisfactory. Lastly, the complainant states that the background documentation submitted clearly shows that torture is practised by the Indian authorities, particularly against militants or suspected terrorists. He claims that he would still be at risk of torture if he was returned to India. 3 The Minister’s delegate stated that the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2001 had been replaced by the LOTA of 2002. The new law apparently established certain safeguards for the accused, such as a prohibition on forced confessions and a guarantee of the accused’s right to have complaints of torture considered. 4 The complainant cites the European Court of Human Rights judgement in Chahal v. United Kingdom [1996] 23 ECHR 413.