CCPR/C/122/D/3090/2017 CCPR/C/122/D/3091/2017 3.5 Lastly, the author argues that Luxembourg failed to provide compensation for his arbitrary detention, as required by article 9 (5) of the Covenant, because the right to compensation for arbitrary detention does not exist under Luxembourg law. Although article 1 of the Act of 30 December 1981 recognizes the possibility of arbitrary detention in contravention of article 5 of the European Convention — equivalent to article 9 of the Covenant — article 1 should not be interpreted in a general sense because the title of the Act does not refer to compensation for arbitrary detention but to compensation in case of unjustified pretrial detention. It follows that article 1 should be interpreted on the basis of article 2 of the same Act, which specifies the three cases that entitle a person to compensation: discharge; acquittal; and detention after the expiry of the time limit for prosecution. Owing to the negligence of the Luxembourg authorities, the author was not tried and the investigation procedure concerning the alleged charges in Luxembourg was not completed. The author cannot therefore obtain compensation under domestic law for his arbitrary detention within the meaning of article 9 of the Covenant. 3.6 With regard to the alleged violation of article 7 of the Covenant, the author considers that the arbitrary detention without legal grounds of the father of three young children, as well as the lack of compensation, is an inhuman and degrading act. With regard to article 14 (1) of the Covenant, the author states that he was denied access to a fair trial and to a court that would examine the criminal charges laid against him. France 3.7 The author claims that the judgment handed down on 18 January 2006 by the Court of Cassation demonstrates that there is no independent, specific and effective procedure in France for providing compensation for unreasonable and unnecessary detention within the meaning of article 9 of the Covenant. 3.8 The author also challenges the decision issued by the Court of Cassation on 20 June 2012, describing it as arbitrary and as entailing a denial of justice, since the release of a detainee does not compensate for the time spent in detention. 3.9 Invoking article 9 of the Covenant, the author argues that the request by the French judicial authorities for placement in detention was inappropriate, unreasonable, unforeseeable and unnecessary. He points out that he had been living in Luxembourg since May 1995 and had therefore not absconded. At the time, however, the mere fact that a person was abroad justified under domestic law the request to the authorities of the host State for provisional arrest. 7 The request for arrest was based only in general terms on articles 2 and 16 of the European Convention on Extradition, which refer to urgency without specifying the circumstances giving rise to the alleged urgency. Submission of a request for the detention of a father of three young children, without prior investigation and without issuing an international arrest warrant, seems both inappropriate and unforeseeable. 3.10 The author then claims that his detention in France from 4 to 28 November 1997 was arbitrary. He was denied access to a judge to rule on his detention on being handed over to France, and he had to wait from 4 until 10 November 1997 for the lawfulness of his detention to be examined. As the author arrived at Loos-lès-Lille remand prison on 7 November 1997, a judge should have automatically ruled on his detention by 8 November 1997 rather than on 10 November 1997 in response to his request to the prison registry. The seven-day period that passed before the author gained access to a competent judge to review his detention is not “prompt” but arbitrary within the meaning of article 9 (3) of the Covenant.8 3.11 Invoking general comment No. 35, the author also argues that the decision to extend his detention handed down on 10 November 1997 is neither legally sound nor necessary within the meaning of article 9 of the Covenant. 7 8 6 The author claims that it took the French Court of Cassation until January 2017 to apply the Committee’s jurisprudence on the proportionality of a request to detain an individual who had left to live abroad. The author notes that the Committee sets a reasonable time limit of 48 hours in paragraph 33 of general comment No. 35. GE.18-10755