CCPR/C/120/D/2285/2013 is a tenuous and indirect one: the alleged involvement of two legal entities that are incorporated in Quebec but, in fact, have no other meaningful connection to that province” (para. 4.15). 6. As the State party suggests, the fundamental criterion for jurisdiction is the existence of a sufficient “connection”2 or “nexus” between the acts or omissions of the State party and the alleged violations. In other words, an author falls under the power or effective control of a State party, and therefore under its jurisdiction, when it is possible to establish factually a sufficient connection between acts or omissions attributable to the State party and allegations of violations of Covenant rights that the author claims to have suffered. The connection is generally considered to be “sufficient” when the person concerned is under the physical control of an official body of the State party. 3 This is the most common hypothesis for a direct connection in which the State, through its bodies, exercises power or effective physical control. 7. However, the Committee was also able to recognize that there was an indirect connection, based on the sufficient influence exercised by one State party over another State or other entity exercising its power or effective control over a person.4 In the case of Munaf v. Romania, while the context was certainly somewhat different, the Committee laid down a principle that could, it would seem, be drawn on in the context of the present communication: “a State party may be responsible for extraterritorial violations of the Covenant if it is a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations in another jurisdiction. Thus, the risk of an extraterritorial violation must be a necessary and foreseeable consequence and must be judged on the knowledge the State party had at the time”.5 8. The present decision clearly follows on from that jurisprudence, since it recognizes that, if it can be determined that the State has sufficient influence over a corporation, then the State exercises, even indirectly, power and effective control over persons who are affected by the activities of the corporation in another country. 9. There is in this case a clear development compared to previous jurisprudence, in that the third party directly responsible for the violation is not a State but a private actor. But, in fact, this development is also in line with the Committee’s jurisprudence, which has long recognized that States parties can only meet their positive obligations under the Covenant “if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities.”6 Furthermore, in its consideration of reports, the Committee has previously recognized that a State can establish jurisdiction and incur responsibility in connection with acts performed by armed groups or self-proclaimed entities on the territory of another State. 7 10. The Committee’s decision in the present case is in line with the way that general international law on the matter is developing. It is true that, as the State party notes, the 2 3 4 5 6 7 GE.17-21900 See paragraph 10.2 of communication No. 56/1979, Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 29 July 1981, in which the Committee explains that the idea of “jurisdiction” in article 1 of the Optional Protocol refers “not to the place where the violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred”. See also paragraph 12.2 of communication No. 52/1979, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Views adopted on 29 July 1981. In the words of paragraph 10 of the Committee’s general comment No. 31, “This principle […] applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State party assigned to an international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation.” See, specifically, communication No. 2005/2010, Hicks v. Australia, Views adopted on 5 November 2015, paras. 4.4 and 4.5. Communication No. 1539/2006, Munaf v. Romania, Views adopted on 30 July 2009, para. 14.2. General comment No. 31, para. 8. In the Committee’s concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7), see paragraph 6 in respect of the Donbas region (Ukraine) and the South Ossetia region (Georgia): “to the extent that it already exercises influence over these groups and authorities which amounts to effective control over their activities”. 15