CCPR/C/115/D/2005/2010 45. In consequence, the violations of the author’s rights manifest in the plea agreement are attributable to Australia under the law of State responsibility. Furthermore, under article 16 of the draft articles on State responsibility, a State can be responsible for aiding or assisting another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. In that respect, there are indications that Australia is internationally responsible for its own role in aiding or assisting the United States in establishing the agreement, for reasons such as: (a) It can be inferred from the inclusion of provisions beneficial to the Australian authorities that Australia exercised a significant degree of influence over the content and formulation of the agreement, or was apprised of and acquiesced in it; (b) The agreement was premised on the assumption that the author would be imminently returned to Australia. In fact, three days after its adoption Australia gave domestic effect to it and the transfer took place; (c) The United States would not have accepted the agreement but for Australian assurances that its relevant provisions would be implemented and upheld in Australia; (d) The cooperation between United States and Australia in the author’s case generally implies that Australia must have been involved in the formulation and adoption of the terms of the agreement. 46. The responsibility of Australia for aiding or assisting the United States in negotiating and accepting the agreement is separate from and additional to its subsequent conduct in post facto adopting the agreement, which gives rise to the responsibility of Australia under article 11 of the draft articles on State responsibility. Claims under articles 12, 14, 17, 19 and 22 in connection with the control order 47. The control order imposed on the author upon release from Yatala Labour Prison violated his rights under articles 12, 14, 17, 19 and 22 of the Covenant because the proceedings were unfair and because there was no necessity for the limitations imposed. 48. The author was not able to fully test the evidence brought by the authorities and upon which the order was issued. In issuing the order, Australia was not required to disclose any information to him if that disclosure was “likely to prejudice national security”, within the meaning of National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004. The availability of the non-disclosure measures under the Act and the risks of further criminal prosecution entailed in them substantially deterred the author from seeking to adduce or contest evidence at the control order hearings. The evidence adduced by the Australian Federal Police appeared to be based solely upon interviews they conducted while the author was at Guantanamo Bay. Given the coercive environment there, there are serious doubts about the lawfulness of the manner of obtaining that evidence, the propriety of its admission in court and its reliability. 49. Furthermore, the legislation did not require the court to determine whether other less invasive methods were available to the authorities for achieving the same purpose of preventive terrorism, such as surveillance. 50. The order was designed to prevent “terrorism” as defined under a broad and vague definition of terrorism in Australian law that does not satisfy the principle of legality and is compounded by the low standard of proof used to assess the threat. 51. None of the facts before the court disclosed evidence of any current or future intention by the author to deliberately harm civilians. No contemporaneous evidence was presented by the Australian Federal Police. The only evidence presented was that relating to his conduct prior to his prolonged detention and subsequent conviction. Faced with the same evidence, the author was effectively required to prove that he was no longer a threat, 22