outside the scope of application of the Covenant,5 but that a State party's obligations in relation to a matter itself outside the scope of the Covenant may still be engaged by reference to other provisions of the Covenant.6 The Committee noted that the author does not claim that extradition as such violates the Covenant, but rather that the particular circumstances related to the effects of his extradition would raise issues under specific provisions of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee found that the communication was thus not excluded ratione materiae. cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. In respect of the so-called "death row phenomenon" the Committee recalled its earlier jurisprudence and noted that "prolonged judicial proceedings do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, even if they can be a source of mental strain for the convicted persons."7 This also applies to appeal and review proceedings in cases involving capital punishment, although an assessment of the particular circumstances of each case would be called for. In States whose judicial system provides for review of criminal convictions and sentences, an element of delay between the lawful imposition of a sentence of death and the exhaustion of available remedies can be necessary to review the sentence. Thus, even prolonged periods of detention under a strict custodial regime on death row could not necessarily be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely availing himself of appellate remedies.8 But each case will depend on its own facts. 6.2 The Committee considered the contention of the State party that the claim is inadmissible ratione loci. Article 2 of the Covenant requires States parties to guarantee the rights of persons within their jurisdiction. If a person is lawfully expelled or extradited, the State party concerned will not generally have responsibility under the Covenant for any violations of that person's rights that may later occur in the other jurisdiction. In that sense a State party clearly is not required to guarantee the rights of persons within another jurisdiction. However, if a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that person's rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. That follows from the fact that a State party's duty under article 2 of the Covenant would be negated by the handing over of a person to another State (whether a State party to the Covenant or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the very purpose of the handing over. For example, a State party would itself be in violation of the Covenant if it handed over a person to another State in circumstances in which it was foreseeable that torture would take place. The foreseeability of the consequence would mean that there was a present violation by the State party, even though the consequence would not occur until later on. 6.5 The Committee observed further that article 6 provides a limited authorization to States to order capital punishment within their own jurisdiction. It decided to examine on the merits the question whether the scope of the authorization permitted under article 6 extends also to allowing foreseeable loss of life by capital punishment in another State, even one with full procedural guarantees. 6.6 The Committee also found that it is clear from the travaux préparatoires that it was not intended that article 13 of the Covenant, which provides specific rights relating to the expulsion of aliens lawfully in the territory of a State party, should detract from normal extradition arrangements. None the less, whether an alien is required to leave the territory through expulsion or extradition, the general guarantees of article 13 in principle apply, as do the requirements of the Covenant as a whole. In this connection the Committee noted that the author, even though he had unlawfully entered the territory of Canada, had ample opportunity to present his arguments against extradition before the Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, which considered the facts and the evidence before it and found that the extradition of the author would not violate his rights under Canadian or international law. In this context the Committee reiterated its constant jurisprudence that it is not competent to re- 6.3 The Committee therefore considered itself competent to examine whether the State party is in violation of the Covenant by virtue of its decision to extradite the author under the Extradition Treaty of 1976 between the United States and Canada, and the Extradition Act of 1985. 6.4 The Committee observed that the Covenant does not prohibit capital punishment for the most serious crimes provided that certain conditions are met. Article 7 of the Covenant prohibits torture and 7 5 Communication No. 117/1981 (M. A. v. Italy), paragraph 13.4. Views on communications Nos. 210/1986 and 225/1987 (Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. Jamaica) adopted on 6 April 1989, para. 13.6. 6 8 Views on communications Nos. 270/1988 and 271/1988 (Randolph Barrett & Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica), adopted on 30 March 1992, para. 8.4. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al. v. Mauritius (No. 35/1978, Views adopted on 9 April 1981) and Torres v. Finland (No. 291/1988, Views adopted on 2 April 1990). 115