Benefits Act, on which the rejection of the unemployment benefit of the author was based, was abrogated by law of 24 April 1985. In this law, however, it was laid down that the law which was in force to that date – including the controversial article 13, paragraph 1, subsection 1 – remained applicable in respect of married women who had become unemployed before 23 December 1984. As these transitionary provisions were much criticized, they were abolished by Act of 6 June 1991. As a result, women who had been ineligible in the past to claim benefits under the Unemployment Benefits Act because of the breadwinner criterion, can claim these benefits retroactively, provided they satisfy the other requirements of the Act. One of the other requirements is that the applicant be unemployed on the date of application. depends on the nature of the subject-matter to which the principle of equality must be applied. The State party contends that in the field of social security, differentiation is necessary to bring about social justice. The incorporation of the breadwinner criterion in WWV should be seen in this light, as its object was to limit the eligibility of the benefit to those who were breadwinners. In this context, the State party refers to the individual opinion 3 appended to the Committee's Views in communication No. 395/1990,4 which states that "article 26 of the Covenant should not be interpreted as requiring absolute equality or non-discrimination in [the field of social security] at all times; instead it should be seen as a general undertaking on the part of States parties to the Covenant to review regularly their legislation in order to ensure that it corresponds to the changing needs of society". 5.3 The State party therefore contends that if the author had been unemployed on the date of application for benefits under the Unemployment Benefits Act, she would be eligible for retroactive benefits on the basis of her unemployed status as from 1 February 1983. However, since the author had found other employment as of April 1984, she could not claim retroactive benefits under the Unemployment Benefits Act. The State party emphasizes that since the amendment of the law on 6 June 1991, the obstacle to the author's eligibility for a benefit is not the breadwinner criterion, but her failure to satisfy the other requirements under the law that apply to all, men and women alike. 5.7 In this connection, the State party submits that it regularly adjusts its social security legislation to accommodate shifts in the prevailing social climate and/or structure, as it has done in the Unemployment Benefits Act. The State party concludes that by amending the Act in 1991, it has complied with its obligations under article 26 and article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant. 6.1 By submission of 8 March 1993, counsel stresses that the central issue in the communication is whether article 26 of the Covenant had acquired direct effect before 23 December 1984, more specifically on 1 August 1983. She argues that the explicit exclusion of married women from benefits under the Unemployment Benefits Act constituted discrimi-nation on the grounds of sex in relation to marital status. Counsel argues that, even if objective and reasonable grounds existed to justify the differentiation in treatment between married men and married women at the time of the enactment of the provision, conditions in society no longer supported such differentiation in August 1983. 5.4 The State party submits that by amending the law in this respect, it has complied with the principle of equality before the law as laid down in article 26 of the Covenant. 5.5 Moreover, the State party reiterates the observations it made in connection with communications Nos. 172/1984 1 and 182/1984.2 It emphasizes that the intent of the breadwinner criterion in the Unemployment Benefits Act was not to discriminate between married men and married women, but rather to reflect a fact of life, namely, that men generally were breadwinners, whereas women were not. The State party argues therefore that the law did not violate article 26 of the Covenant, since objective and reasonable grounds existed at the time to justify the differentiation in treatment between married men and married women. 6.2 Counsel submits that, under the amended law, it is still not possible for the author, who has found new employment, to claim the benefits she was denied before. In this connection, she points out that the author failed to apply for a benefit during the period of her unemployment because the law at that time did not grant her any right to a benefit under the Unemployment Benefits Act. The author applied for a benefit after the breadwinner requirement for women was dropped as from 23 December 1984, but 5.6 Furthermore, the State party argues that the implementation of equal rights in national legislation 1 3 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortysecond Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/42/40), annex VIII.B, Broeks v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 9 April 1987. 2 Ibid., Annex VIII.D, Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 9 April 1987. Appended by Messrs. Nisuke Ando, Kurt Herndl and Birame Ndiaye. 4 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortyseventh Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/47/70), Annex IX.P, Sprenger v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 31 March 1992. 63