"1. Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. Judicial remedies. It explained that, firstly, extraordinary conditions limit the use of section 33. Secondly, section 33 is said to reflect a balance between the roles of elected representatives and courts in interpreting rights: "2. An act or a provision of an act in respect of which a declaration made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration. "A system in which the judiciary is given full and final say on all issues of rights adversely impacts on a key tenet of democracy – that is, participation of citizens in a forum of elected and publicly accountable legislatures on questions of social and political justice ... The 'notwithstanding' clause provides a limited legislative counterweight in a system which otherwise gives judges final say over rights issues". "3. A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration. 5.4 Lastly, the Government affirmed that the existence of section 33 per se is not contrary to article 4 of the Covenant, and that the invocation of section 33 does not necessarily amount to an impermissible derogation under the Covenant: "Canada's obligation is to ensure that section 33 is never invoked in circumstances which are contrary to international law. The Supreme Court of Canada has itself stated that 'Canada's international human rights obligations should [govern] ... the interpretation of the content of the rights guaranteed by the Charter'". Thus, a legislative override could never be invoked to permit acts clearly prohibited by international law. Accordingly, the legislative override in section 33 was said to be compatible with the Covenant. "4. Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under subsection (1). "5. Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4)." The State party's information and observations 5.1 The communication was transmitted to the State party under rule 91 of the Committee's rules of procedure on 5 August 1991. In its submission of 6 March 1992 (which also related to communications Nos. 359/1989 and 385/19891), the State party noted that a number of litigants had challenged the validity of Bill No. 178 before the Quebec courts, and that hearings on the issue before the Court of Quebec were held on 14 January 1992. The proceedings continued, and lawyers for the provincial government of Quebec were scheduled to present the point of view of Quebec on 23 and 24 March 1992. 5.5 The State party therefore requested the Committee to declare the communication inadmissible. 6.1 In his comments, the author contended that his case is against Bill No. 101 and not against Bill No. 178, and that it is based upon the State party's perceived violations of the provisions of the Constitution Act of Canada 1867, and not on the Constitution Act of 1982. He argued that any challenge of the contested legislation would be futile, in the light of the decision of the government of Quebec to override the Supreme Court's judgement of 15 December 1988 by enactment of Bill No. 178 a week later. 5.2 The State party contended that Quebec's Code of Civil Procedure entitles the author to apply for a declaratory judgement that Bill No. 178 is invalid, and that this option is open to him regardless of whether criminal charges have been instituted against him or not. It argued that consistent with the well-established principle that effective domestic remedies must be exhausted before the jurisdiction of an international body is engaged, Canadian courts should have an opportunity to rule on the validity of Bill No. 178, before the issue is considered by the Human Rights Committee. 6.2 The author claimed that the "notwithstanding" clause of section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not apply to this case, as he had been charged for violating the Charter of the French Language in 1978, before section 33 took effect. In this context, he argued that no Canadian Government can abrogate or supplant freedoms that were in existence before the Charter came into being, and that under the Canadian tradition of civil liberties, rights may be extended but cannot be curtailed. 5.3 The State party further argued that the "notwithstanding" clause in section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is compatible with Canada's obligations under the Covenant, in particular with article 4 and with the obligation, under article 2, to provide its citizens with 1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortyeighth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/48/40), annex XII.P, communications Nos. 359/1989 (Ballantyne and Davidson v. Canada) and 385/1989 (McIntyre v. Canada), Views adopted on 31 March 1993 at the Committee's forty-seventh session. 6.3 Finally, the author asserted that the "notwithstanding" clause of section 33 is a negation of the rights enshrined in the Charter, as it allows (provincial) legislatures to "attack minorities and suspend their rights for a period of five years". 80