17
guarantor of all those rights not restricted by the very act of deprivation of liberty; and the
prisoner, for his or her part, is subject to certain statutory and regulatory obligations that
he or she must observe.
50.
The position of guarantor in which the State is situated is the basis for all
those measures which, under international human rights law, it must adopt in order to
respect and ensure the rights of persons deprived of liberty.
51.
The Inter‐American Court – following the European Court of Human
Rights – established as of the case of Neira Alegría et al., that “every person deprived of
her or his liberty has the right to live in detention conditions compatible with her or his
personal dignity, and the State must guarantee to that person the right to life and to
humane treatment. Consequently, since the State is the institution responsible for
detention establishments, it is the guarantor of these rights of the prisoners.” 70
52.
Subsequently, in the case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute,” the
Court further developed this concept, and added inter alia that:
Given this unique relationship and interaction of subordination between
an inmate and the State, the latter must undertake a number of special
responsibilities and initiatives to ensure that persons deprived of their
liberty have the conditions necessary to live with dignity and to enable
them to enjoy those rights that may not be restricted under any
circumstances or those whose restriction is not a necessary consequence
of their deprivation of liberty and is, therefore, impermissible. Otherwise,
deprivation of liberty would effectively strip the inmate of all his rights,
71
which is unacceptable.
53.
Similarly, the IACHR established more than a decade ago in its Report on
the Merits No. 41/99 in the case of Minors in Detention that:
The State, by depriving a person of his liberty, places itself in the unique
position of guarantor of his right to life and to humane treatment. When
it detains an individual, the State introduces that individual into a "total
institution"‐‐such as a prison‐‐where the various aspects of his life are
subject to an established regimen; where the prisoner is removed from
his natural and social milieu; where the established regimen is one of
absolute control, a loss of privacy, limitation of living space and, above
70
I/A Court H.R., Case of Neira Alegría et al. V. Peru. Judgment of January 19, 1995. Series C No. 20,
para. 60. This fundamental criterion has been reiterated consistently by the Inter‐American Court both in its
judgments and in its orders on provisional measures; with respect to the latter, the first such decision was in its
order granting provisional measures on the Urso Branco Prison, Brazil, Order of the Inter‐American Court of
Human Rights, June 18, 2002, Considering paragraph 8.
71
I/A Court H.R., Case of “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” V. Paraguay. Judgment of September 2, 2004.
Series C No. 112, paras. 152 and 153. See also, I/A Court H.R., Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center
of Catia). Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C No. 150, para. 87.
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