75
members of the Police or Armed forces shall be prohibited from exercising direct custody
of persons deprived of liberty, unless it is a police or military institution” (Principio XX). 252
216.
Accordingly, with respect to the employment of police officers in
penitentiary functions, the Commission has consistently held that:
International standards on detention contemplate that, as a general rule,
the authority responsible for the investigation of a crime and arrest
should not be the authority responsible for administering detention
centers. This is a safeguard against abuse, and an essential basis for
prompt judicial supervision of detention centers. 253
Furthermore, United Nations protection mechanisms have also pointed to the State’s duty
to employ well‐trained and well‐equipped prison guards and professional penitentiary
administrators who are independent of the police. 254
217.
At the same time, the deployment of members of the armed forces to
control security in prisons must be exceptional, commensurate with the gravity of the
situation prompting it, and restricted to exceptional cases explicitly contemplated by law
and geared to achieving legitimate goals in a democratic society. In such cases, the actions
of the armed forces must be subject to the scrutiny and control of the civilian authority, in
particular as regards the establishment of the corresponding legal liabilities. 255
218.
During his visit to El Salvador, for instance, the Rapporteur on the Rights
of Persons Deprived of Liberty learned that members of the armed forces were being used
to control the security perimeter of certain prisons and to detect the admission of illicit
items. He was also informed by various sources that soldiers allegedly engaged in certain
abuses and arbitrary acts against inmates and the family members and other visitors. The
Rapporteurship was able to ascertain that neither the prison authorities nor any other
civilian authorities monitored or supervised in any way the searches of persons carried out
by the army. Additionally, no procedures have been established for complaining or
appealing to prison directors in cases in which inmates’ relatives consider that they were
256
the victims of the powers that the army exercises without restrictions of any kind.
252
In the same vein the European Penitentiary Rules laid down that, “[p]risons shall be the
responsibility of public authorities separate from military, police or criminal investigation services” (Rule 71).
253
IACHR, Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road Towards Strengthening Democracy in Bolivia,
Cha. III, para 199; IACHR, Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Ch. VIII, para. 14.
254
See in this regard, United Nations, Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report of the Mission to Uruguay, A/HRC/13/39/Add.2, adopted on
December 21, 2009. Ch. IV: Administration of criminal justice: underlying causes for collapsing administration of
justice and penitentiary systems, paras. 43 and 105; United Nations, Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions,
Report on mission to Honduras, A/HRC/4/40/Add.4, adopted on December 1, 2006, paras. 76 and 101.
255
IACHR, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, Ch. VI, para. 683; IACHR, Report on Citizen
Security and Human Rights, para. 104.
256
IACHR, Press Release 104/10 ‐ IACHR Office of the Rapporteur Attests to Structural Deficiencies in
Prison System of El Salvador. Washington, D.C., October 20, 2010.
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