CCPR/C/127/D/2719/2016 and evidence in order to determine whether such risk exists, unless it can be established that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.7 8.6 In the present case, the Committee observes that both the author and his counsel were allowed to cross-examine the victim and both asked her questions at a court hearing on 10 May 2010, on which occasion she gave extensive and detailed testimony. The Committee further observes that the victim’s statements, the consistency of which the author wished to question by examining the witness for a second time, were not the sole evidence on which the courts’ findings of guilt were based. The Committee also notes that the issues that the author wanted to raise during the requested examination, and about which he had learned only after having examined the witness for the first time, could have been raised by the author before the domestic courts and equally assessed by the courts, even in the absence of the victim. The Committee further observes that the domestic courts thoroughly assessed the author’s request to secure the attendance of the witness and provided reasoned decisions for their refusal. In that respect, the Committee attaches great importance to the reasoning adduced by the domestic courts stating that the restriction on the author’s right was justified by the need to protect the victim’s rights. The Committee notes in this regard the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights, which, in assessing whether an accused person has received a fair trial or not, takes into account the rights of the perceived victim.8 In the circumstances of the present case, it is not apparent from the information before the Committee that the court’s refusal to allow the author to reexamine the victim was such as to infringe on the equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence. Accordingly, the Committee is unable to conclude that article 14 (3) (e) has been violated. 8.7 As regards the author’s allegations under articles 14 (2) and 7 of the Covenant, the Committee notes the author’s complaint that he was kept in a metal cage in the courtroom during the court proceedings, which he found humiliating and caused him physical pain, and that journalists were able to take pictures of him while handcuffed. The author submits that such a security measure should be perceived as excessive, amounts to a violation of the presumption of innocence and constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of articles 14 (2) and 7 of the Covenant, respectively. 8.8 As regards the author’s allegations under article 7 of the Covenant, the issue before the Committee is whether the author’s handcuffing and placement in a metal cage during the court hearings subjected him to degrading treatment. The Committee recalls that the prohibition in article 7 is complemented by the positive requirements of article 10 (1) of the Covenant: “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”. It also recalls its general comment No. 21 (1992) on humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, which places on the State party a positive obligation to guarantee the human dignity of all persons deprived of their liberty and to ensure that they enjoy all the rights set forth in the Covenant, subject to the restrictions that are unavoidable in a closed environment (para. 3).9 The Committee notes that the State party has addressed these allegations only on the admissibility and has failed to demonstrate that the measure imposed on the author was consistent with article 7 of the Covenant. Accordingly, and in the absence of other pertinent information on file, the Committee concludes that the facts as presented reveal a violation of the author’s rights under article 7 of the Covenant. 8.9 As regards the author’s allegations under article 14 (2) of the Covenant, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence as reflected in paragraph 30 of its general comment No. 32, according to which the presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt and requires that persons 7 8 9 8 See Lin v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. See, inter alia, S.N. v. Sweden (application No. 34209/96), judgment of 2 July 2002, para. 47; Oyston v. United Kingdom (application No. 42011/98), judgment of 22 January 2002; and Y. v. Slovenia (application No. 41107/10), judgment of 28 May 2015, paras. 69–72 and 106. See Pustovoit v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/110/D/1405/2005), para. 9.2.