CAT/C/68/D/782/2016 Complainant’s additional comments 8. On 28 February 2019, the complainant indicated that the State party, in its reply of 11 January 2019, had not provided any substantive response to the complainant’s claims and, a fortiori, had not challenged the truth of those claims. Consequently, he did not think he should comment on the Government’s response. The complainant maintained that he continues to face a personal, present and serious risk of being subjected to torture if he is extradited to Egypt. Bearing in mind the urgency of his situation, and his detention pending extradition since February 2016, he has requested the Committee to consider his complaint without delay. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 9.1 Before considering any claim submitted in a communication, the Committee must decide whether it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. 9.2 The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 9.3 In accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, the Committee must ascertain whether the complainant has exhausted all available domestic remedies, although this shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged 14 or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the alleged victim. 9.4 The Committee notes the State party’s claim that the communication should be declared inadmissible under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention on the grounds that the complainant has not exhausted all domestic remedies, given that an application for revocation can still be filed against the judgment of the Court of Cassation. The Committee also notes the complainant’s argument regarding the extraordinary nature of this remedy and the fact that it is ineffective except in the limited cases provided for by law, since it does not have a suspensive effect and therefore provides no guarantee of effective relief. 15 9.5 The Committee refers to its jurisprudence and recalls that in the present case, in accordance with the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the complainant was only required to apply for remedies that are directly related to the risk of being subjected to torture in Egypt. 16 The Committee notes that the State party has not specified how an application for revocation of the Court of Cassation’s judgment of 25 May 2016 could affect the complainant’s extradition to Egypt, given that it has not indicated whether that remedy would under the circumstances be effective in preventing the complainant’s extradition and whether it had a suspensive effect. The Committee also notes that the State party has not refuted the complainant’s claims that an application for revocation would be ineffective to prevent his extradition outside the limited cases provided for by law and that such an application does not have a suspensive effect. The Committee recalls that in several cases brought to its attention, an extradition order had been signed by the Head of Government even before the Court of Cassation had ruled on an application for revocation,17 thereby confirming that the Government considered the judgment of the Court of Cassation as definitive and as constituting res judicata. Considering that Moroccan law does not specify whether that remedy has a suspensive effect, that the State party merely cites the exceptional circumstances in which an application for revocation may be filed and that the State party has provided no specific examples of jurisprudence clarifying the 14 15 16 17 8 See Asfari v. Morocco (CAT/C/59/D/606/2014), paras. 8.1, 8.2 and 12.2; and Gharsallah v. Morocco (CAT/C/64/D/810/2017), para. 7.2. Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, paras. 13, 18 (e) and 34. See A.R. v. Sweden, communication No. 170/2000, Official Records of the General Assembly, fiftyseventh session, Supplement No. 44 (A/57/44), p. 204 et seq., para. 7.1, and Kalinichenko v. Morocco (CAT/C/47/D/428/2010), para. 14.3. See also general comment No. 4, para. 34. See R.A.Y. v. Morocco (CAT/C/52/D/525/2012), paras. 6.3 and 6.4. See also Ayden v. Morocco (CAT/C/66/D/846/2017), para. 7.2; Onder v. Morocco (CAT/C/66/D/845/2017), para. 6.2; and Erdoğan v. Morocco (CAT/C/66/D/827/2017), para. 8.3. GE.19-22535