the RDI programme.496 In the same vein, Sweden was, in 2005 and 2006, found to have acted in violation of the CAT and ICCPR for handing over two individuals to CIA agents in the course of their rendition to Egypt.497 244. While it is possible that the governments of OSCE participating States that co-operated with the United States in the framework of this programme may not have been aware of the full details of the CIA activities at the early stages of the programme, information available in the public domain, including media articles from 2002 and 2003, was “capable of proving that there were serious reasons to believe that if [detainees were] to be transferred into US custody under the ‘rendition’ programme, [they] would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to [torture or ill-treatment]”.498 At least from that period onwards, authorities of participating States “knew or ought to have known”499 that the detainees faced a real risk of torture, ill-treatment or arbitrary detention. This engages their responsibility as accomplice under international law, as will be explored further in Part 3II-A of this report. 245. Concurring information from various sources, including former detainees interviewed by ODIHR, indicates that a number of OSCE participating States, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Uzbekistan are likely 496 UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/10/3, op. cit., note 131, para. 52. 497 UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Report to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, op. cit., note 22, para. 38. See, also, UN CAT, Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, 20 May 2005, paras. 10.2, 11.13, 12.29, 12.30, 13.4, <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2f34%2fD%2f233%2f2003&La ng=en>: “10.2. [A] Swedish television broadcast (…) examining the circumstances of the expulsion of the complainant (…) stated that [he] had been handcuffed when brought to a Stockholm airport, (…) and that [he was] handed over to a group of special agents [of the United States] by Swedish police. (…) 11.13. [It was] contended that [this transfer] was carried out by members of the Special Access Program of the US Department of Defense who were engaged in returning terrorist suspects to their countries of origin utilising ’unconventional methods’. (…) 13.4. (…) [A]ccording to the facts submitted by the State party to the Committee, the first foreign State offered through its intelligence service an aircraft to transport the complainant to the second State, Egypt, (…). In the Committee’s view, the natural conclusion from these combined elements, that is, that the complainant was at a real risk of torture in Egypt in the event of expulsion, was confirmed when, immediately preceding expulsion, the complainant was subjected on the State party’s territory to treatment in breach of, at least, article 16 of the Convention by foreign agents but with the acquiescence of the State party’s police. It follows that the State party’s expulsion of the complainant was in breach of article 3 of the Convention.” UN HRC Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, Communication No. 1416/2006, 10 November 2006, paras 3.10, 4.12, 11.2, 11.4, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/1416-2005.html>: “3.10. [Alzery] was then escorted to the police station at the airport, where he was handed over to some ten foreign agents in civilian clothes and hoods. Later investigations by the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman, disclosed that the hooded individuals were United States' [CIA] and Egyptian security agents. (…) 11.2. [T]he State party concedes [a number of] violations of the Covenant or the Optional Protocol, on the basis of parallel findings of the Committee against Torture in the case of Agiza v Sweden (…) “11.4. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party itself has conceded that there was a risk of ill-treatment that – without more – would have prevented the expulsion of the author consistent with its international human rights obligations.” 498 ECtHR, El-Masri v. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, op. cit., note 300, paras. 218, 126-127. 499 Ibid., para. 218: “[T]he Court attaches importance to the reports and relevant international and foreign jurisprudence, and – given the specific circumstances of the present case – to media articles, (…) which constitute reliable sources reporting practices that have been resorted to or tolerated by the US authorities and that are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention. (…) This material was in the public domain before the applicant’s actual transfer into the custody of the US authorities. It is capable of proving that there were serious reasons to believe that if the applicant was to be transferred into US custody under the ‘rendition’ programme, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. Consequently, it must be concluded that the Macedonian authorities knew or ought to have known, at the relevant time, that there was a real risk that the applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.” 106