329. This differentiation in treatment carries important consequences for aliens prosecuted before military commissions. Military commission proceedings depart in several ways from trial rules and procedures used in federal courts and courts-martial. The MCA 2009 expressly provides for exceptions to procedures and rules of evidence used in general courts-martial when required by the “unique circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence operations during hostilities or by other practical need”.752 Whereas the MCA 2009 provides for significant improvements to the previous iterations of the Guantánamo military commissions,753 the current system continues to be criticized as providing a lower level of safeguards than ordinary courts.754 While it is beyond the scope of this report to Years in Prison for Conspiracy to Murder Individuals Overseas, Providing Material Support to Terrorists”, Federal Bureau of Investigation website, 9 September 2014, <http://www.fbi.gov/miami/press-releases/2014/jose-padilla-re-sentenced-to-21-yearsin-prison-for-conspiracy-to-murder-individuals-overseas-providing-material-support-to-terrorists>. John Walker Lindh pleaded guilty to “one count of supplying services to the Taliban and a charge that he carried weapons while fighting on the Taliban’s front lines in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance”. “Department of Justice Examples of Terrorism Convictions Since Sept. 11, 2001”, United States Department of Justice website, 23 June 2006, <http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/June/06_crm_389.html>; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. John Lindh, Case No. 02-37A, “Plea agreement”, <http://www.justice.gov/ag/pleaagreement>; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. John Lindh, Case No. 02-37A, “Indictment”, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/129.pdf>. 752 MCA 2009, § 949a(b): “(1) In trials by military commission under this chapter, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General, may make such exceptions in the applicability of the procedures and rules of evidence otherwise applicable in general courts-martial as may be required by the unique circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence operations during hostilities or by other practical need consistent with this chapter. (…) (3) In making exceptions (…) the Secretary of Defense may provide the following: “(A) Evidence seized outside the United States shall not be excluded from trial by military commission on the grounds that the evidence was not seized pursuant to a search warrant or authorization. (B) A statement of the accused that is otherwise admissible shall not be excluded from trial by military commission on grounds of alleged coercion or compulsory self-incrimination so long as the evidence complies with the provisions of section 948r of this title. (C) Evidence shall be admitted as authentic so long as - ‘‘(i) the military judge of the military commission determines that there is sufficient evidence that the evidence is what it is claimed to be; and ‘‘(ii) the military judge instructs the members that they may consider any issue as to authentication or identification of evidence in determining the weight, if any, to be given to the evidence. (D) Hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general courts-martial may be admitted in a trial by military commission (…).” ODIHR was provided with similar information during its interview with the American Civil Liberties Union, 28 February 2014, op. cit., note 255, and with the Center for Constitutional Rights, op. cit., note 255. 753 See, for example, “US: Revised Military Commissions Remain Substandard”, Human Rights Watch website, 28 October 2009, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/28/us-revised-military-commissions-remain-substandard>; “House Passes Changes to Guantánamo Military Commissions”, American Civil Liberties Union website, 8 October 2009, <https://www.aclu.org/nationalsecurity/house-passes-changes-guantanamo-military-commissions>. 754 “US: Revised Military Commissions Remain Substandard”, Human Rights Watch website, ibid.; “House Passes Changes to Guantánamo Military Commissions”, American Civil Liberties Union website, ibid.; “CCR Condemns President Obama’s Embrace of Military Commission System”, Center for Constitutional Rights website, 20 January 2011, <http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/ccr-condemns-president-obama%E2%80%99s-embrace-of-military-commissionsystem>; Mason C. Clutter, “Guantanamo: Ten Years After 9/11”, Human Rights Magazine, Vol. 38, 2011, <http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol38_2011/human_rights_winter2011 /guantanamo_ten_years_after_9-11.html>; David Glazier, “The Development of an Exceptional Court: The History of the American Military Commission”, in Fionnula Ni Aolain & Oren Gross, Guantánamo and Beyond, Exceptional Courts and Military Commissions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 37; Jordan J. Praust, “Still Unlawful: The Obama Military Commissions, Supreme Court Holdings, and Deviant Dicta in the D.C. Circuit”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2, April 2012, pp. 381-387, <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Paust-final.pdf>; UN HRC, David Hicks v. Australia, “Individual Communication under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR”, 23 August 2010, para. 255, <http://thejusticecampaign.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/UN-Communication.pdf>; United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Hamdan v. United States of America, Case No. 11-1257, “Brief of Amici Curiae Japanese American Citizens League, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Asian Pacific American Bar Association, and Asia Law Caucus in Support of Petitioner and Urging Reversal”, 22 November 2011, pp. 3-4, <https://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=248939> ; ODIHR interview with the Center for Constitutional Rights, op. cit., note 255. 143