fresh air.405 Co-operation with interrogators, or lack thereof, allegedly had a critical impact on the well-being of detainees, as those who did not provide information or were seen as breaking the constantly-changing prison rules were punished, whereas those who cooperated were sometimes “rewarded”.406 Former detainees described to ODIHR the forms such punishment could take depending on a particular detainee’s compliance, including the removal of basic items that were considered comfort items,407 and prolonged isolation. They explained that different levels of compliance were associated with the number of comfort items they were allowed to have in their cells. The highest level allowed them to keep all of their items, whereas the lowest level only allowed them to wear shorts and forced them to sleep on a concrete block.408 In relation to solitary confinement, they mentioned being taken out and put back in isolation after very short breaks. They reported being in quasi-isolation for months, even years in some cases, in cells in which they felt the temperature was either freezing cold or suffocatingly hot.409 221. Documented cases dating from the Bush administration point to the routine use of excessive force against detainees by the Initial Reaction Forces (IRF)410 and during the force-feeding of hunger strikers.411 Testimonies of former detainees about the IRF corroborate previous reports indicating that during transportation and other operations led by the IRF, detainees were pepper-sprayed, shackled, chained, beaten, kicked and/or punched.412 Mustafa Ait Idir explained that, on one occasion, he was so severely beaten U.S. Custody”, United States Senate Armed Services Committee, op. cit., note 403, p. 52: “"all aspects of the [detention] environment should enhance capture shock, dislocate expectations, foster dependence, and support exploitation to the fullest extent possible.” 405 During the June-July 2005 hunger strike, detainees formulated some demands, including having “proper human food and clean water. We are not given adequate amounts of food and the food is often old and inedible. The water is frequently dirty and tastes contaminated [and] (…) to see sunlight, and not be forced to go months without seeing daylight.” “The Guantánamo Prisoner Hunger Strikes and Protests: February 2002 - August 2005”, Center for Constitutional Rights, September 2005, p. 10, <http://ccrjustice.org/files/Final%20Hunger%20Strike%20Report%20Sept%202005.pdf>. This is consistent with the testimonies of former detainees interviewed by ODIHR. 406 ODIHR interview with David Hicks, op. cit., note 228: “Everything was turned into a form of punishment”; ODIHR interview with Murat Kurnaz, op. cit., note 400: “They punished me and put me in isolation [when I refused to talk], where I was anyway coming from. (…) They didn’t have anything more to take away (…). They took my clothes, they took everything away”; ODIHR interview with Lakhdar Boumediene, op. cit., note 216. Boumediene explained that interrogators offered him food in exchange for information: “The food was bad and the interrogators would of course play on this weak point”; ODIHR interview with Mustafa Ait Idir and Hajj Boudella, op. cit., note 217. Ait Idir mentioned that medical personnel would tell him to cooperate with interrogators to be given water. See, also, The Report of The Constitution Project's Task Force on Detainee Treatment, op. cit., note 183, p. 28. 407 These included, for instance, toothpaste, toothbrushes, deodorant, soap, and blankets. 408 ODIHR interview with David Hicks, op. cit., note 228; ODIHR interview with Murat Kurnaz, op. cit., note 400; ODIHR interview with Lakhdar Boumediene, op. cit., note 216. 409 Ibid.; ODIHR interview with Mustafa Ait Idir and Hajj Boudella, op. cit., note 217. See, also, UN Special Procedures, “Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay”, op. cit., note 23, para. 53. 410 The standard operating procedure for Camp Delta adopted in March 2003 describes IRF (also called Immediate Reaction Force, Instant Reaction Force or Extreme Reaction Force) as a team of five military police officers in riot gear who were “intended to be used primarily as a forced cell extraction team, specializing in the extraction of a detainee who is combative, resistive, or if the possibility of a weapon is in the cell at the time of the extraction”. “Camp Delta Standard Operating Procedures”, Joint Task Force Guantánamo, 28 March 2003, pp. 3.3, 24.1-24.2, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/SOP%201-238.pdf>. 411 The force-feeding of hunger strikers and the process in which it occurs remains of concern to this day. This issue will be further explored in the sub-section on “Management of hunger strikes and force-feeding at Guantánamo” below. 412 ODIHR interview with Murat Kurnaz, op. cit., note 400; ODIHR interview with David Hicks, op. cit., note 228; ODIHR interview with Mustafa Ait Idir and Hajj Boudella, op. cit., note 217; ODIHR interview with Lakhdar Boumediene, op. cit., note 216. See, also, UN Special Procedures, “Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay”, op. cit., note 23, para. 54. 94