(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.69 The UN Human Rights Committee has remarked that, if there are reasonable grounds for regarding certain elective offices as incompatible with tenure of specific positions (e.g., the judiciary, high-ranking military office, public service), measures to avoid any conflicts of interest should not unduly limit the rights protected by para. (b).70 In one case, restrictions imposed in the Netherlands preventing a serving police officer from taking his elected place in a local council were upheld: the Committee took the view that there was no violation of Art. 25 because the restrictions were designed to prevent a conflict of interest.71 Similar principles would apply to restrictions in the armed forces. The right to demonstrate The freedom of peaceful assembly is guaranteed by Art. 21 of the ICCPR and Art. 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It is clear that, in general, the imposition of punishment (including a professional disciplinary penalty) for participating in a demonstration will be regarded as a breach of Art. 11 and that any legitimate restrictions must satisfy the criterion of proportionality.72 However, Art. 11.2 of the ECHR states: This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the state. There is no such equivalent wording under Art. 21 of the ICCPR (see Box 8.3). Accordingly, it could be argued that, for the purposes of the ECHR, a state might be permitted to impose restrictions on demonstrations by members of the armed forces beyond those permitted under the ICCPR or that did not satisfy the proportionality test. This, however, is a somewhat unrealistic prospect since to do so would nevertheless constitute a violation of the ICCPR (which refers to specified reasons for limitations where “necessary in a democratic society”). Moreover, most restrictions on members of the armed forces are related to national security, public order, or public safety, in any event. 3. Different Approaches Para. 23 of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security states that, “while providing for the individual service member’s civil rights, each state will ensure that its armed forces are politically neutral”. The balance between the communal interest in the political neutrality of the armed forces as a whole and the political rights of individual members of the armed forces can be drawn in various ways. As can be seen from Box 8.3, restrictions on the right to belong to a political party or to stand for political office that apply to members of the armed forces exist in a number of OSCE states. Georg Nolte and Heike Krieger submit that three positions can be seen to operate within European coun69  In addition, Art. 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR states: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.” 70  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25 (57), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996), para. 25. 71  Debreczeny v. The Netherlands, UN Human Rights Committee, 3 April 1995, Communication No. 500/92, UN Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/500/1992. 72  Ezelin v. France, European Court of Human Rights, 26 April 1991, European Human Rights Reports, Vol. 14, 1992, p. 362. 60 Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel