8 CDL-AD(2013)019 have judicial personality, and administrative and financial autonomy. Members of such bodies shall be elected by the National Assembly or Parliament, to which these bodies shall submit annual reports, and be accountable. All state organs shall facilitate the work of such independent constitutional bodies. 19. A “human rights body” shall be established as one of the above-mentioned constitutional bodies. According to the information provided by the Constitutional Bodies’ Commission of the National Constituent Assembly, the constitutional recognition of the “human rights body” is meant to guarantee its stability, its administrative and financial independence, and its full powers. The “human rights body” shall be composed of independent and neutral personalities, who shall exercise their mandate for one (nonrenewable) tenure of six years. This human rights body shall be charged with ensuring and monitoring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and their development. It is also tasked to investigate cases involving violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, by dealing with them itself, or by submitting them to the competent authorities, and to provide its opinion on all human rights related draft legislation. 20. The UN Paris Principles stipulate that national human rights institutions shall be given as broad mandates as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text. This includes the preparation of opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on human rights-related matters, either at the request of government, parliament or other competent bodies, or, through the exercise of the an institution’s power, without higher referral. The national human rights institution may also decide to publish such documents, which shall relate to legislative and administrative provisions, as well as those relating to judicial organizations, human rights violations in general, the national situation of human rights, or may include proposals to the Government to end specific human rights violations. 21. Other tasks set out by the Paris Principles include the promotion and harmonization of national legislation and practices with international human rights instruments ratified by the respective State, contributions to human rights reports submitted to United Nations bodies and cooperation with the latter, as well as assisting in the formulation of programmes for human rights education. 22. While Article 2 of the Law reflects some of the tasks of national human rights institutions stipulated in the Paris Principles, it is noted that these are limited to various manners of advising the President of Tunisia on human-rights related issues (upon presidential request), raising awareness on human rights issues, and implementing government policies. The Higher Committee should constitute an independent and autonomous human rights body; this should also be outlined explicitly in the Law. 6 As such, it should not become active merely upon request of the President of Tunisia, but should rather be able to provide opinions, recommendations, proposals or reports on any matters concerning the promotion and protection of human rights (unless these tasks are taken over by another human rights protection body, such as an ombuds institution7). This may happen at the request of any public body, including the President, the National Assembly or Parliament and the Government, but also on the Higher Committee’s own initiative. The Law should also enable the Higher Committee to monitor how its recommendations and proposals are followed by relevant authorities. 23. At the same time, while Article 2 of the Law provides this national human rights institution with the mandate to receive and examine (presumably individual) human rights complaints, it does not appear to have the powers to autonomously investigate and respond directly to such complaints. Instead, they are then sent on to a “competent authority” for submission to courts. Referring complaints to competent authorities should not preclude the Higher Committee from resolving alleged human rights violations itself (unless, as stated above, there is another human rights body with the specific mandate to review human rights 6 See Article 3 of the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia Act. According to the information available, the establishment of an ombuds institution is not envisaged at this stage in Tunisia. 7