Doc. 11302 Report 95. In the same letter, Mr De Vidts stated that “in principle, such documents are not made public, which is certainly the case if they are classified”.53In a subsequent follow-up letter sent on my behalf, I indicated to NATO Legal Services, in accordance with my authorisation as AS/Jur Rapporteur, that I would be prepared to treat the document in a confidential manner.54However, Mr De Vidts replied in the following terms: “I can only but confirm that the decision sheet of the North Atlantic Council dated 4 October 2001 is a classified document. I have to state that in order to have access to NATO classified information, such person should have an appropriate security clearance.”55 96. Notwithstanding this general rule, which I understand to be a reflection of broader issues around transparency within NATO,56there was a further noteworthy feature of the 4 October 2001 measures to emerge from our correspondence with NATO Legal Services. Qualifying his earlier point, Mr De Vidts stated: “However, with regard to certain decisions separate communications to the public in general are made. This has also been the case for some of the decisions taken on 4 October 2001 by the North Atlantic Council” (emphasis added). 97. The clear indication here is that the public record57is not a complete reflection of the measures agreed by the NATO Allies and the considerations underpinning them. It is my conclusion, again confirmed by my American sources, that there were additional components to the NATO authorisation of 4 October 2001 that have remained secret. 98. In the course of my inquiry, I have made repeated requests for information regarding the full scope of the NATO authorisation, specific elements of its practical application, and whether its provisions remain in force to the present day. Regrettably, NATO itself has been largely unresponsive to my requests.58 99. Nevertheless, my further analysis of the NATO framework has shown that the authorisations of 4 October 2001 were vital in paving the way for the United States to develop its most important partnerships in the context of the “war on terror”. In particular, the CIA would exploit both the blanket overflight clearances and the access to airfields to carry out its clandestine operations through the airspace and on the territory of a broad range of foreign states. 100. The blanket overflight clearances granted in this regard were especially significant. In the NATO public statement, the clearances were said to apply to “military flights related to operations against terrorism” but, even without sight of the classified parts of the authorisation, this characterisation is misleadingly narrow. 53. Letter to Mr G. Buquicchio, Secretary of the Venice Commission, dated 6 April 2006, ibid. 54. Letter to Mr De Vidts from Mr Drzemczewski, Head of the Secretariat, Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (AS/Jur), dated 24 March 2006. 55. Letter in reply to Mr Drzemczewski’s letter of 24 March 2006 from Mr De Vidts, NATO Legal Adviser, Reference CJ(2006)0330, dated 13 April 2006. It should be noted that NATO is accustomed to rejecting requests for “NATO information”. Even unclassified information remains for the most part inaccessible, based on the following principle: “NATO unclassified information … can only be used for official purposes. Only individuals, bodies or organisations that require it for official NATO purposes may have access to it … NATO information marked in this manner is subject to release via agreement from its originators and subject to recognised storage procedures for its protection” – see letter from Wayne Rychak, Director, NATO Office of Security, to Jacob Visscher, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 6 February 2002 (emphasis in original); cited in Alasdair Roberts, “Entangling Alliances: NATO’s Security of Information Policy and the Entrenchment of State Secrecy”, Cornell International Law Journal, 36.2 (November 2003): 329-360, at p. 9 in the text. 56. For insight into the NATO secrecy and security-of-information regime and its negative impact on transparency in general, I have found the work of the Canadian specialist on transparency issues, Professor Alasdair Roberts, very informative. Specific articles can be found at www.aroberts.us/research.html. 57. The only public record of the 4 October 2001 meeting of the North Atlantic Council is the statement to the press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 4 October 2001, supra note 44. Mr De Vidts attached a print-out of this statement from the NATO website to his letter of 13 April 2006. 58. Regrettably, NATO itself has been largely unresponsive to our repeated requests for information regarding the full scope of the authorisation, elements of its practical application, and whether its provisions remain in force to the present day. We have sent five separate items of correspondence to Mr De Vidts: letters from Mr Drzemczewski, Head of the Secretariat, Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (AS/Jur) dated 24 March 2006 and 26 April 2006; e-mails of 27 September 2006 and 9 November 2006; and fax of 9 November 2006, receipt of which was confirmed in a telephone conversation with Mr De Vidts’ office on 5 December 2006. We have thus far received only a single, incomplete reply: letter from Mr De Vidts, dated 13 April 2006; the reply was incomplete because Mr De Vidts said that one of our questions “is under consideration and at our earliest convenience I will contact you about these issues”. On 27 March 2007 I wrote to Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-General of NATO, requesting clarification on the outstanding questions. I have yet to receive any response to my letter. 21