Doc. 11302 Report knew about even “tiny little pieces” of these operations in their own countries; and it ruled out any distribution whatsoever of the classified information beyond these small circles, unless expressly approved by the United States Government itself. 165. Yet none of these restrictive rules mitigates the fact that Poland and Romania, as host countries, were knowingly complicit in the CIA’s secret detention programme. When we sought confirmation from one of our sources in the CIA that these were bilateral (rather than unilateral) arrangements, and that every programme was carried out with the express authorisation of the relevant partner state, we received this emphatic response: “One of the great enduring legacies of the Cold War, which has carried into these alliances, is that NATO countries don’t run unilateral operations in other NATO countries. It’s a tradition that is almost sacrosanct. We [the CIA] just don’t go trampling on other people’s turf, especially not in Europe.” 166. Hence the importance of our source’s affirmation that the CIA forms important intelligence partnerships not just with civilian counterparts but also in the military sphere. As our inquiry progressed, we realised that the CIA’s fellow civilian intelligence agencies (domestic and foreign) are not necessarily the most appropriate choices as partners or liaisons on highly secretive operations due to their encumbered civilian oversight mechanisms. Thus, an integral part of our investigative strategy, building on our knowledge of the NATO framework, was to apply equal scrutiny to the CIA’s partnerships with military intelligence services. 4. Secret detention operations in Poland 4.1. Partnering with military intelligence in Poland 167. Since the May 2002 “quasi-reform”139of its secret services, Poland has had two civilian intelligence agencies: the Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego, or ABW); and the Foreign Intelligence Agency (Agencja Wywiadu, or AW). Neither of these services was considered a viable choice as a CIA partner for the sensitive operations of the HVD programme in Poland, precisely because they are “subject to civil supervision, both by parliament and government”.140Since their creation, the heads of both the ABW and the AW have been appointed and tasked by the prime minister, and are directly accountable to the Council of Ministers, initially through a cabinet committee chaired by the PM (Kolegium do Spraw S/luzb Specjalnych) and latterly through the position of Minister-Co-ordinator for the Special Services.141The ABW and the AW are both also answerable to the Commission for Special Services in the Polish Parliament (Sejmowa Komisja do Spraw S/luzb Specjalnych). 168. According to our sources, the CIA determined that the bilateral arrangements for operation of its HVD programme had to remain absolutely outside of the mechanisms of civilian oversight. For this reason the CIA’s chosen partner intelligence agency in Poland was the Military Information Services (Wojskowe S/luzby Informacyjne, or WSI), whose officials are part of the Polish armed forces and enjoy “military status” in defence agreements under the NATO framework. The WSI was able to maintain far higher levels of secrecy than the two civilian agencies due to its recurring ability to emerge “virtually unscathed”142from postcommunism reform processes designed at achieving democratic oversight. 139. See Andrzej Zybertowicz, “An Unresolved Game – The role of the Intelligence Services in the nascent Polish Democracy”, conference paper published jointly by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee, and the Human Rights Centre at the Department of Law, Durham University, Oslo, September 2003, copy on file with the Rapporteur (hereinafter “Zybertowicz, ‘The Role of the Polish Intelligence Services’”), at p. 2: “when the Polish Parliament passed the new law on secret services … instead of explanation of [the] many scandals and taking legal measures towards those responsible, instead of accountability, the public opinion has been offered a quasi-reform of the services. It deserves this label because, among other things, it did not meet [the] objects of its own designers.” 140. See response of Poland to Council of Europe Secretary General under Article 52 ECHR, supra note 94, at p. 2. The phrase is used in this context to describe the system of oversight for the AW: “Parliament [the Sejm] exercising its prerogatives through the Commission for Special Services, also controls the Polish Foreign Intelligence Agency in matters relating to its co-operation with partner secret services of other states.” 141. The position of Minister-Co-ordinator for the Special Services was created in November 2005 and is presently filled by Minister Zbigniew Wassermann. 142. See Zybertowicz, “The Role of the Polish Intelligence Services”, supra note 139, at pp. 3 and 6-7. 34