JALLOH v. GERMANY JUDGMENT – JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES RESS, PELLONPÄÄ, BAKA AND ŠIKUTA 53 All in all, we accept that the treatment to which the applicant was subjected was harsh. However, anyone engaging in drug trafficking must take into account the possibility of being subjected to law-enforcement measures which are far from pleasant. The measures applied in this case in our view do not reach the threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Article 8 As we have voted against finding a violation of Article 3, we have held that a separate issue arises under Article 8 of the Convention1. Therefore it is necessary for us to explain why in our view this provision has not been violated either. We accept without hesitation that the forcible administration of emetics to the applicant constituted an interference with his right to respect for his private life in terms of his physical integrity, and that therefore Article 8 is applicable. As to the justification for the measure under paragraph 2 of Article 8, we note that it appears to be a point of contention among German criminal courts and legal writers whether Article 81a of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a statutory basis for the administration of emetics by force (see paragraphs 33-40 of the judgment). However, although the Federal Constitutional Court did not decide this issue in the applicant’s case, both the Wuppertal District Court and the Wuppertal Regional Court considered that that Article authorised the forcible administration of emetics. Many criminal courts and legal writers appear to agree with this view. Having regard to this and to the wording of Article 81a, the national courts’ interpretation in our view does not disclose any arbitrariness, and therefore we are satisfied that there was a sufficient legal basis for the impugned measure. We also consider that the provision satisfies the foreseeability test and that therefore the interference with the applicant’s private life was in accordance with the law, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Moreover, we do not have any hesitation in concluding that the interference in question pursued aims which are consistent with paragraph 2 of Article 8, in particular the prevention of drug-related crime and the protection of the health of others, notably potential drug consumers. The question remains whether the interference could be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” as is also required by paragraph 2 of Article 8. We accept that this question is rather more difficult than some of 1. Judge Šikuta considered that the matter should be dealt with exclusively under Article 3. Assuming that a separate issue arises under Article 8, he agrees with the reasoning of this dissenting opinion.