States of America) during an anti-El Salvador demonstration". The author was arrested by a team consisting of an Amsterdam City Police officer and an officer belonging to the Royal Military Police (Koninklijke Marechaussee), which also has the task of providing military assistance to the Amsterdam City Police. The State party affirms that, since the author did not submit himself willingly to the authorities, a brief struggle ensued, in the course of which the author's jaw was injured. He received medical treatment for a bruise to his jaw; the surgeon on duty stated that the author did not sustain any permanent injury, and the latter did not in fact report for a scheduled medical examination two weeks later. 4.3 Insofar as the applicable procedures are concerned, the State party argues that in cases such as the one affecting the author, namely the filing of complaints about the acts of officers of the Royal Military Police, complaints have to be addressed to the prosecutor of the Royal Netherlands Army (the Auditeur-Militair), as civilian judicial authorities are not competent to prosecute military personnel. A decision as to whether or not to prosecute is taken by a military legal officer (verwijzingsofficier) who acts on behalf of the Commanding-General, on the advice of the Prosecutor of the Army. This was also the procedure applied to the case of the author. Against the decision not to prosecute the military police officer who allegedly maltreated the author, the author lodged a complaint with the National Ombudsman, an independent body instituted by law that mediates in questions related to governmental acts against which no legal remedy is available. The Ombudsman is supposed to report his findings both to the administrative authority to which the disputed act is imputable and to the plaintiff, evaluating whether the governmental act was proper and, optionally, recommending possible remedies to the Administration. In the present case, the Ombudsman advised the author to appeal to the High Military Court (Hoog Militair Gerechtshof) against the decision communicated by the prosecutor of the Army. 4.4 On 13 June 1983, the High Military Court decided that it was not competent to decide on the case, as only the Minister of Defence can order the military legal officer or Commanding-General to prosecute a case. In this context, the State party points out that a provision analogous to article 12 of the civilian Code of Penal Procedure, under which a complaint with an appeal court can be filed if no prosecution is decided upon, does not exist. In the present case, the Minister of Defence held that, as formal notification of non-prosecution to the Royal Military Police had already been given, he could not oblige the military legal officer or the Commanding-General to prosecute the case. The author, subsequently, did not request further action by the Ombudsman, who therefore did not initiate an inquiry. 4.5 Finally, the State party observes that legislative proposals that would resolve the discrepancy between the Code of Military Penal Procedure and its civilian counterpart have been introduced in the Netherlands Parliament and are awaiting approval. An interim solution has been ruled out, given the extensive legislative changes that it would require and the rare occurrence of the complaints in question. 4.6 With regard to the admissibility of the communication, the State party distinguishes between: (a) the actual treatment of the author upon his arrest; and (b) the alleged lack of an adequate legal procedure to see the arresting officer prosecuted. 4.7 With regard to the first issue, the State party recalls the requirement of article 2 of the Optional Protocol that only individuals who have exhausted all available domestic remedies may submit a com-munication to the Committee and submits that a tort action against the Government could not a priori be called futile. With regard to the alleged violations of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant, it submits that the allegations of the author do not come within of the scope concepts "torture" or "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" or the obligation to treat individuals "with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person", nor indeed, within the scope of any other concept in the Covenant, and therefore cannot be regarded as constituting a violation of Covenant rights. Furthermore, in the State party's view, the author has not substantiated his allegations in such a way as to support his claim credibly. 4.8 Concerning the second issue, the State party submits: 36