CCPR/C/127/D/2920/2016 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claims that her forced hospitalization and detention in a psychiatric hospital on three occasions (on 12 January 2011, on 12 December 2011 and on 9 August 2013) violated her rights under article 9 of the Covenant. 7.3 The Committee recalls that commitment to and treatment in a psychiatric institution against the will of a patient constitutes a form of deprivation of liberty that falls under the terms of article 9 of the Covenant. 28 It further recalls that article 9 (1) requires that deprivation of liberty must not be arbitrary and must be carried out with respect for the rule of law. The second sentence of paragraph 1 prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, while the third sentence prohibits unlawful deprivation of liberty, that is, deprivation of liberty that is not imposed on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. The two prohibitions overlap, in that arrests and detentions may be both arbitrary and unlawful.29 Furthermore, it recalls that the notion of arbitrariness is not to be equated with “against the law” but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law. 30 7.4 While acknowledging that States may deem an individual’s mental health to be impaired to such an extent that, in order to avoid harm to the individual or others, the issuance of a committal order is unavoidable,31 the Committee considers that involuntary hospitalization can only be applied, if at all, as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time, and must be accompanied by adequate procedural and substantive safeguards established by law. 32 The procedures should ensure respect for the views of the individual and should ensure that any representative genuinely represents and defends the wishes and interests of the individual. 33 7.5 The Committee notes the author’s allegations that she was involuntarily apprehended and hospitalized (three times for more than 15 months in total) in order to punish her for protecting her rights and the appeal to the President of Kazakhstan, in violation of the national legislation and without a court order. 7.6 The Committee observes the author’s submissions that, on 25 September 2009, she was charged with “knowingly false denunciation” under article 351 of the Criminal Code. Subsequently, despite the author’s objections, two compulsory psychiatric examinations were ordered by the Balkhash city court, which resulted in the conclusion that the author suffered from chronic delusional disorder. The Committee notes that, on 5 August 2010, the Balkhash city court found the author “mentally unfit” to stand trial and ordered her forced psychiatric inpatient hospitalization and treatment. On 2 November 2010, the Karaganda regional court confirmed that decision on appeal. 7.7 The Committee observes the author’s submissions that, on 31 January 2012, the Supreme Court quashed the above-mentioned court decisions as the courts had violated the law regulating the application of the compulsory medical measures to the author and had sent the case back for reconsideration. In the context of its reconsideration of the case, the Balkhash city court ordered a new psychiatric examination of the author, which confirmed the previous diagnosis and found her unfit to stand trial but did not find that the author had committed violent acts and constituted a threat to herself or others. On 26 July 2012, the Balkhash city court concluded that the expert examination of 7 July 2010 had been conducted in a manner that violated the law and it did not include any conclusion that the author constituted a threat to herself or others. Thus, the court found the author unfit to stand trial based on her diagnosis but decided not to apply the compulsory medical measures. 7.8 The Committee also notes the State party’s observation that the Balkhash city court took a decision to order the author’s compulsory treatment in a psychiatric institution based on the results of the conclusions of two expert psychiatric examinations. However, on 31 28 29 30 31 32 33 See, for example, A. v. New Zealand (CCPR/C/66/D/754/1997), para. 7.2; and Fijalkowska v. Poland (CCPR/C/84/D/1061/2002), para. 8.2. See the Committee’s general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, paras. 10–11. Ibid., para. 12. See also, for example, M.G.C. v. Australia (CCPR/C/113/D/1875/2009), para. 11.5. See Fijalkowska v. Poland, para. 8.3. See general comment No. 35, para. 19. See also Fijalkowska v. Poland, para. 8.3. See general comment No. 35, para. 19; and CCPR/C/CZE/CO/2, para. 14. See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 9 (2006) on the rights of children with disabilities, para. 48. 11