CAT/C/71/D/908/2019 sufficiently substantiated his claims, which raise substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention. 7.4 In the light of the above and given that the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the communication submitted under article 3 of the Convention admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainant to Afghanistan would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8.3 The Committee must assess whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon removal to Afghanistan. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the country of return. The Committee recalls that the aim of the assessment is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture or other ill-treatment in the country to which he or she would be returned.23 It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 24 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017), according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in the State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group which may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee recalls that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”.25 Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: (a) the complainant’s ethnic background; (b) political affiliation or political activities of the complainant or his or her family members; (c) arrest or detention without guarantee of fair treatment and trial; (d) incommunicado detention or other forms of arbitrary and illegal detention in the country of origin; and (e) religious affiliation.26 8.5 The Committee also recalls that the burden of proof lies on the complainant, who must present an arguable case, that is, submit substantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, personal, present and real. However, when the complainant is in a situation where he or she cannot elaborate on his or her case, for instance when the complainant has demonstrated that he or she has no possibility of obtaining documentation relating to his or her allegation of torture, or is deprived of his or her liberty, the burden of proof is reversed and it is for the State party concerned to investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the complaint is based. 27 The Committee further recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned, however it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment 23 24 25 26 27 See, inter alia, X v. Switzerland (CAT/C/53/D/470/2011). See, inter alia, S.K. et al. v. Sweden, para. 7.3. See the Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017), para. 11. Ibid., para. 45. Ibid., para. 38. 9