regional counterparts, have continued to follow this approach of distinguishing between the different forms of ill-treatment. While the definitions have been refined since these early cases, torture continues to carry a special stigma which distinguishes it from other forms of ill-treatment. However, in subsequent decisions, most notably Ireland v UK, the purposive element of the definition of torture was for a time marginalised in favour of a threshold based upon a sliding scale of severity between the three acts. Ireland v UK concerned the treatment of IRA suspects by UK troops in Northern Ireland. The case was brought by the Irish Government against the UK alleging, among other things, that use of ‘the five techniques’ (sleep deprivation, stress positions, deprivation of food and drink, subjection to noise and hooding) during interrogations constituted a breach of Article 3. In its judgement, the Court drew a distinction between torture, inhuman treatment, and degrading treatment, holding that such a distinction was necessary because of the “special stigma” attached to torture.262 An act must cause “serious and cruel suffering” to constitute torture. 2 The European Regional System In The Greek Case, the European Commission held that the abuses exist on a continuum, with each an aggravated form of another. The defining characteristic of torture is not necessarily the nature and severity of the act, but rather the purpose for which it was perpetrated. Thus, “all torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment also degrading. The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation, is unjustifiable… Torture… has a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment. Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience.”261 In this instance, the Court held that ‘the five techniques’ caused “if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering… and also led to psychiatric disturbances during the interrogation,” and therefore constituted inhuman treatment, but did not “occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture.”263 The Court thereby contradicted the Commission’s decision in The Greek Case that such practices did amount to The Greek Case (1969) op. cit. Ireland v UK (1978), op. cit., §167. 263 Ibid. §167. 261 262 57