General Comment General ­Comment No. 16 – The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all e ­ conomic, social and cultural rights, 2005 Provisions related to Reproductive Rights According to Paragraph 5, “Women are often denied equal enjoyment of their human rights, in particular by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by tradition and custom, or as a result of overt or covert ­discrimination. Many women experience distinct forms of ­discrimination due to the intersection of sex with such factors as race, colour, ­language, religion, political and other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status, such as age, ethnicity, disability, marital, refugee or migrant status, resulting in compounded disadvantage”. Paragraphs 7-8 deal with formal and substantive equality: “Formal equality assumes that equality is achieved if a law or policy treats men and women in a neutral manner. Substantive equality is concerned, in addition, with the effects of laws, policies and practices and with ­ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent disadvantage that particular groups experience. Substantive equality for men and women will not be achieved simply through the enactment of laws or the adoption of policies that are, prima facie, gender-neutral.” Paragraph 15 deals with the issues of temporary special measures: “The principles of equality and non-discrimination, by themselves, are not always suffi cient to guarantee true equality. Temporary special measures may sometimes be needed in order to bring disadvantaged or marginalized persons or groups of persons to the same substantive level as others. Temporary special measures aim at realizing not only de jure or formal equality, but also de facto or substantive equality for men and women. However, the application of the principle of equality will s­ ometimes require that States parties take measures in favour of women in order to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination. As long as these measures are necessary to redress de facto discrimination and are terminated when de facto equality is achieved, such differentiation is legitimate.” 134