CCPR/C/123/D/2537/2015 Annex [Original: English] Individual opinion of Sarah Cleveland (concurring) 1. I concur in the Committee’s finding of a violation of the author’s right to appellate review of his conviction under article 14 (5) of the Covenant and its determination that its Views on the merits of the author’s claims constitute sufficient remedy for the violation found. I write separately to express my understanding of the Committee’s conclusion that the author’s rights under article 25 of the Covenant were also violated. 2. As the Committee observes, consistent with article 25, States may have a legitimate interest in prohibiting an individual from holding public office as a result of serious criminal conduct. Like term limits on public office, such restrictions can in fact serve the public interest in promoting effective democratic governance and ensuring the effective participation of the general public in political life. Any such restrictions on public service, however, must be established by law and be objective and reasonable. They must be proportionate to the severity of the crime and they must be applied consistent with due process.1 3. A permanent prohibition on public service can satisfy these criteria under certain circumstances, as the Committee notes. That is particularly true where a high-level government official commits serious crimes, including large-scale corruption involving State assets. 4. The requirement that a lifelong ban on public service must be proportionate to the individual circumstances could be satisfied in at least two ways. First, an automatic lifelong ban could apply only to a narrow set of cases: a clearly-defined range of serious crimes, when committed by a narrow range of high-level public servants. As former Committee member Gerald Neuman has observed, a number of States expressly provide in their constitutions for ineligibility for public service as an authorized or mandatory consequence of impeachment.2 Alternatively, a law could provide more broadly for the possibility of a prohibition on public service, but that law could be applied only based on an independent judicial assessment of the proportionality of the ban to the circumstances in each individual case. 5. In the present case, the Colombian constitutional provision at the time imposed an automatic ban on public service for life for any person convicted of offences affecting State assets.3 The provision did not further specify which crimes fall into that category. It did not further address their severity or their impact on State assets, nor was application of the automatic ban limited to high-level public servants. Finally, the State party did not suggest that the provision had been narrowed or clarified through judicial interpretation. The provision therefore fell under the second category above, for which an individual proportionality assessment would be required. 6. My colleagues conclude that the constitutional provision was thus too vague to render the sanction foreseeable. That may be true with respect to the full range of crimes 1 2 3 16 See general comment No. 25 (1996) on participation in public affairs and the right to vote, paras. 4 and 14. See also European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Amicus curiae brief for the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Berlusconi v. Italy, CDLAD(2017)025-e (collecting the legislation of 62 countries relating to procedural protections regarding disqualification from standing for public office). See Paksas v. Lithuania (CCPR/C/110/D/2155/2012), appendix. The relevant constitutional provision in force in 2004 stated: “Without prejudice to any other penalties that the law may establish, any persons who have, at any time, been convicted of offences involving State assets shall not be permitted to: put themselves forward as candidates for elected office: be elected or appointed as public servants; or enter into, either personally or through an intermediary, contracts with the State” (art. 122). GE.18-22078