advisable rather to focus on changing violent or otherwise unlawful behaviour, which may 377 be best achieved through disengagement programmes. The focus of disengagement programmes is to prevent or change an individual’s relationship with a particular group, cause or ideology that views violence as justified 378 to achieve its objectives. The focus is thus on changing behaviours, as opposed to 379 beliefs. Such programmes for prisoners seek to: • support them in finding alternative ways and opportunities to fulfil their needs; • empower them to pursue their goals through legitimate means and to question the relevance of the use of violence; • strengthen personal agency over their own decisions and behaviour; • expose inconsistencies and inaccuracies in their current beliefs that support violence, and reduce their identification with a violent group or cause; • increase their emotional tolerance and acceptance; • encourage them to think about the (personal) costs associated with their participation in violent acts; and • encourage them to aspire to a law-abiding life without violence, and help them acquire 380 the necessary skills, for instance, to be employed after release. Some countries do not have specific disengagement programmes for VERLT but offer the same disengagement programmes to all prisoners, the focus of which is on violence, 381 rather than on the extremist views justifying violence. There is a concern that treating a category of prisoners differently than the rest of the prison population could elevate their status and, paradoxically, may even serve recruitment efforts by violent extremist groups. Key principles of disengagement programmes There is no “one size fits all” model for interventions. Policies should be gender- and agesensitive and highly tailored to the local context, culture and legal traditions, as well as to the nature of VERLT in a given country, the individual prisoners participating in such 377 Accordingly, and since this also appears to be more consistent with the OSCE concept of VERLT as set out earlier, ODIHR stressed that reintegration and rehabilitation efforts should focus explicitly on disengagement from terrorism or violence rather than the more amorphous notion of deradicalization. See: Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” within a Human Rights Framework, op. cit., note 23, p. 61. 378 Council of Europe, “Council of Europe Handbook”, op. cit., note 2, para. 72. 379 OSCE, Non-custodial Rehabilitation and Reintegration in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism, op. cit., note 364, p. 13. 380 UNODC, Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons, op. cit., note 2, p. 76; Council of Europe, “Council of Europe Handbook”, op. cit., note 2, para. 70. 381 Sweden and Greece, for example, were listed as having no specific deradicalization/disengagement programmes. See: Basra and Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Extremist Offender Management in 10 European Countries, op. cit., note 51, pp. 7-8. 78