Guidebook guidance on how to interpret those rights.55 Without being exhaustive, a number of examples in this direction may be found in the Directive on the right to interpretation regarding the quality of the interpretation as well as in the Directive on legal aid regarding the quality of legal assistance. For example, Art. 6 (3)(e) ECHR simply states that “everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (…) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court. In the case Kamasinski v Austria,56 the ECtHR did not find a violation when at one police interrogation a prisoner served as interpreter and at another the interpreter was not registered in the official register for interpreters.57 In comparison, EU law provides a more comprehensive framework to ensure the quality of translations and interpretations. The EU Directive requires Member States to take concrete measures to ensure quality. Further, EU Member States should also endeavour to establish a register to facilitate access and promote adequacy of the translation.58 Similarly, concerning the quality of legal aid lawyers, ECHR standards provide that everyone has the right to legal assistance and if necessary free legal aid.59 In its case law the ECtHR established possible remedies for inadequate legal advice but does not demand States to implement concrete measures to ensure quality legal advice.60 Although the Directive on legal aid falls short in giving concrete guidance, it explicitly requires States to guarantee effective legal aid systems as well as adequate quality of legal aid.61 Second, compared to most international law instruments, EU law is binding and provides concrete sanctions when a State fails to implement the Directives or a decision by the CJEU (e.g., infringement proceedings by the European Commission including financial penalties imposed by the CJEU62). Therefore, States have stronger incentives for the timely and correct transposition of EU law into national law and implementation of CJEU judgements.63 STANDARDS ample, the ECtHR jurisprudence in the context of procedural rights was subject to change. While in the case Salduz v Turkey the ECHR recognised the right of access to a lawyer prior to or at least from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police unless there are compelling reasons to restrict this right,64 its subsequent judgements were contradictory. Some strengthened the previous jurisprudence by stating that denying access to a lawyer without compelling reasons is not only a violation of Article 6 if there is a risk of selfincrimination but in all cases irrespectively of whether the statement has a consequence for the overall fairness of the proceeding.65 Others departed from the principles set in Salduz v Turkey finding that a breach of the right of access to a lawyer may amount to a violation of Article 6 only if the subsequent proceedings ‘as a whole’ had been unfair.66 This position was reiterated also in Ibrahim and Others v the UK. There, the ECtHR established that “safety interviews”, in which framework no selfincrimination took place, did not violate the rights of access to a lawyer. The ECtHR found, however, a violation of Article 6 (3)(c) with regard to one applicant whose questioning as a witness was not interrupted when he started to self-incriminate as in this case the procedure as a whole was not deemed fair.67 While the interpretation of the Directives also depends on the jurisprudence of the CJEU and might be subject to change, the text of the Directives requires the access to a lawyer during police interrogation irrespective of the overall fairness (see Chapter 1.4.1, also for limitations). Nevertheless, the protection of the rights of suspects and accused accorded by EU secondary law should not be read in isolation but shall always be interpreted in light of the fundamental rights as established by the EU Charter and the ECHR.68 More generally, the international legal framework, such as the UN treaties and conventions, should also be taken into consideration. In addition, it should also be recognised that the Directives lay down minimum rules and Member States can adopt higher safeguards. The level of protection should never fall below the standards provided by the ECHR or relevant obligations under instruments of international law to which EU Member States are party. Finally, in comparison to ECHR standards, EU Directives allow for less leeway in their interpretation due to their detailed legal framework. For ex- 24 25