A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 torture. It is also important to underline that the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering has to be committed for a specific purpose referred to in the Convention, such as the extraction of a confession or information. For example, severe pain, inflicted during a medical intervention, with the purpose of treating a patient, does not satisfy the element of intent. (d) Purpose 35. Article 1 explicitly names several purposes for which torture can be inflicted: extraction of a confession; obtaining information from a victim or a third person; punishment, intimidation and coercion; and discrimination. However, there is a general acceptance that these stated purposes are only of an indicative nature and not exhaustive. At the same time, only purposes which have “something in common with the purposes expressly listed” are sufficient12. Noteworthy of the examples included in article 1 is that most of these purposes are related to “the interests or policies of the State and its organs.”13 They are linked to the work of law enforcement authorities and similar State agents and implicitly refer to situations in which the victim finds itself “at least under the factual power or control of the person inflicting the pain or suffering.”14 36. Torture constitutes a particularly aggravated form of ill-treatment. It differs from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CIDT), not necessarily by the intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted, but by the specific purpose of the act. This line of reasoning is in line with the earlier position of the European Commission on Human Rights since the Greek Case.15 (e) Powerlessness of the victim 37. Torture, as a most serious violation of the human right to personal integrity and dignity, is predominantly inflicted on persons deprived of their liberty. Persons held in captivity, be it in police custody, remand facility or prison, or deprived of their liberty in any other context, find themselves in a situation of complete dependency and are therefore particularly vulnerable to any abuse. It is against this background that the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering for a specific purpose requires a particularly strong moral stigma and legal prohibition. 38. At the same time, this does not mean that the Convention outlaws the infliction of severe pain or suffering. A police officer who frees a hostage from its hostage-taker or who defends himself against a violent attack is entitled to inflict severe pain or suffering, with the pivotal qualification that the inflicted pain or suffering be proportional to the lawful goal of policing and that no less intrusive measure is available. The proportionality test, however, can never be applied when a person is powerless and at the mercy of its captors. The powerlessness of the victim was an essential criterion when the distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment was introduced into the Convention. 12 13 14 15 14 Burgers, Herman J. and Danelius, Hans. United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other, Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 1988, 188. Ibid. 199. See also Ingelse, Chris. The Role of the UN Committee Against Torture in the Development of the UN Convention Against Torture. 2001, 211. Burgers and Danelius, 120. ECHR, Greek Case, 12 YB 1, 1969.