ized as torture, should never be relied on as proof of the victim’s guilt, irrespective of its probative value; • although the treatment to which the applicant was subjected did not attract the special stigma reserved for acts of torture, it did meet the minimum level of severity covered by the ambit of the Article 3 prohibition; • the use of such evidence obtained in violation of Article 3 in criminal proceedings raises serious issues as to the fairness of such proceedings; • the general question of whether the use of evidence obtained by an act amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment automatically renders a trial unfair is left open; but, it cannot be excluded that on the facts of a particular case the use of evidence obtained by intentional acts of ill-treatment not amounting to torture will render the trial against the victim unfair, irrespective of the seriousness of the offence allegedly committed, the weight attached to the evidence and the opportunities that the victim had to challenge its admission and use at his trial. The judgment is surprising in that it leaves open the possibility that evidence that has been obtained through inhuman or degrading treatment could be admissible without violating the right to a fair trial. However, although the theoretical possibility might exist, the reality is that circumstances where evidence obtained in a way that is inhuman or degrading could be adduced are hardly imaginable.370 This case echoes the Rochin case, where the United States Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by police officers who had forcibly opened the suspect’s mouth and extracted the contents of his stomach was inadmissible notwithstanding its reliable nature. The Supreme Court ruled that This is conduct that shocks the conscience […] They are methods too close to the rack and the screw […] Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community’s sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalise the temper of a society. 371 This principle has been upheld also by the UK’s highest court in a case involving the admissibility of evidence of uncertain provenance. That court categorically held that evidence that could have been obtained through torture must be excluded.372 Methods of restraint Under international law, the use of methods of restraint is primarily governed by the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Rule 33 states that instruments of restraint 370 For example in Göçmen, the applicant was found guilty of terrorist offences and of being a member of a proscribed organization. It was subsequently established that he had been ill treated and that evidence obtained during this ill-treatment had formed part of the case against him. As such, the European Court held that he did not have a fair trial, ECtHR, Göçmen and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 72000/01, 17 October 2006, paras. 67-76. 371 U.S. Supreme Court, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 372 House of Lords, A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71, 8 December 2005. Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights 131