The Prohibition of Torture and Ill-treatment in the African Human Rights System: A HANDBOOK FOR VICTIMS AND THEIR ADVOCATES of what it considers to be ‘good and compelling’ reasons for a delay of more than six months from the exhaustion of domestic remedies for submitting complaints. In the case of Gabriel Shumba v. Zimbabawe, the complaint was filed with the Commission 16 months after the complainant was forced to flee the country fearing for his safety. In its decision on admissibility, the Commission stated, Indeed, as the Respondent State has noted, the African Commission has not specified what a reasonable period is but it is apparent from its practice that it has tended to be flexible and as such, determines this question on a case-by-case basis. For instance, in several communications, the African Commission has admitted communications that have been brought before the African Commission more than 16 months after the violation is reported to have taken place or domestic remedies were exhausted. Consequently, the African Commission believes that the Complainant in the present communication having filed the communication 16 months after the violation took place, met the conditions laid down in Article 56(6) of the African Charter.418 The Commission did not extrapolate on how the delay met the conditions of Article 56(6) or the ‘good and compelling’ reason for the delay. Yet in the case of Michael Majuru v. Zimbabwe, the complaint was filed 22 months after the complainant fled Zimbabwe fearing for his life and safety. The complainant alleged that the 22 month delay was caused as he was undergoing psychotherapy in South Africa following his experience of harassment and threats on his life by persons he believed to be part of the Zimbabwean intelligence and security services. He also stated that he was waiting for the situation in Zimbabwe to improve so that he could exhaust domestic remedies. The Commission accepted the fact that the complainant had fled the country and therefore ‘needed time to settle’, but declared the case inadmissible as ‘twenty-two months after fleeing the country is clearly beyond a reasonable man’s understanding of a reasonable period of time’.419 While the Commission has become increasingly progressive on the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies, in particular in cases where these are inadequate or ineffective, it is at the same time moving towards a more restricted application of the reasonable time requirement under article 56(6) of the Charter. Cases which have been settled The Commission will not receive a communication that is submitted if a ‘case with the same parties, alleging the same facts’420 has been settled by or is pending before another international adjudicatory mechanism, such as the UN Committee against Torture or the UN Human Rights Committee.421 However, the fact that a matter 418 ACHPR, Gabriel Shumba v. Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 288/2004, para. 44. 419 ACHPR, Michael Majuru v. Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 308/05, para. 110. 420 ACHPR, Mpaka-Nsusu Andre Alphonse v. Zaire (Admissibility), Comm. No. 15/88, 5th Ordinary Session (8 October 1988). 421 African Charter, supra note 9, Article 56(7). 100