CCPR/C/121/D/2419/2014 10.5 The Committee observes that the author had the opportunity to submit and challenge evidence concerning his removal and had his asylum application examined by the Danish Immigration Service and reviewed by two different panels of the Refugee Appeals Board, and by the Chair of the Board, who inter alia examined the new evidence submitted by the author. The Committee also recalls its jurisprudence that article 13 of the Covenant offers some of the protection afforded under article 14 of the Covenant, but not the right of appeal to courts. 13 Accordingly, the author’s claim regarding the absence of appeal against the Board’s decisions is therefore inadmissible ratione materiae under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 10.6 The Committee also considers that the author has not sufficiently substantiated his claims concerning the procedure before the Refugee Appeals Board, under articles 13 and 26 of the Covenant for purposes of admissibility and that this part of the communication must therefore be declared inadmissible in accordance with article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.7 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author’s claims with respect to articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant should be held inadmissible owing to insufficient substantiation. The Committee however considers that the author has sufficiently substantiated his claims for the purposes of admissibility. Accordingly, the Committee declares the communication admissible as it may raise issues relating to articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant and proceeds to its examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 11.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 11.2 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal14 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. In making that assessment, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin. 15 11.3 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party and that it is generally for the organs of States parties to the Covenant to review or evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or a denial of justice. 16 11.4 The Committee notes the author’s submission that he would face a real risk of being subjected to a treatment contrary to articles 6 and 7 if deported to Afghanistan since he would be persecuted by A.M.B. in relation to the death of his driver. The Committee notes the State party’s argument that all the evidence related to that claim was assessed by the Danish Immigration Service and then the Refugee Appeals Board. Subsequently, the Chair 13 14 15 16 See the general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 62. See also communication No. 2291/2013, A and B v. Denmark, Views adopted on 13 July 2016, para 7.3. See for example communications No. 2007/2010, X. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 9.2; No. 282/2005, S.P.A. v. Canada, decision adopted on 7 November 2006; No. 333/2007, T.I. v. Canada, decision adopted on 15 November 2010; No. 344/2008, A.M.A. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 12 November 2010; and No. 692/1996, A.R.J. v. Australia, Views adopted on 28 July 1997, para. 6.6. See, for example, X. v. Denmark (footnote 14 above), para. 9.2; and communication No. 1833/2008, X. v. Sweden, Views adopted on 1 November 2011, para. 5.18. See communications No. 1763/2008, Pillai et al. v. Canada, Views adopted on 25 March 2011, para. 11.4; and No. 1957/2010, Lin v. Australia, Views adopted on 21 March 2013, para. 9.3. 9