CCPR/C/114/D/2343/2014 2.4 The author adds that, together with the Ultras Ahlawy club, he helped to organize the electoral campaign of Hamdeen Sabahy from the Al-Karama opposition party during the presidential elections. However, he states that the club is neither directly against the current Government, even if it does not approve its authoritarian methods, nor in agreement with the agenda of the main opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the club has experienced several confrontations with the Egyptian authorities. The author also refers to the Port Said massacre of 1 February 2012, during which 70 Ultras Ahlawy members were killed by members of another fan club on the occasion of a football match. 2 The author claims that the police watched passively what was going on, demonstrating that this massacre had taken a political dimension. 3 2.5 The author states that the Ultras Ahlawy members were a target of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, which kidnapped, tortured and killed some members in December 2012.4 He also states that the members of the club are increasingly harassed and followed closely by the police of the current military regime; that one of the local club leaders was recently killed by the police;5 and another local leader was arrested and accused of having participated in the Port Said massacre, but was released the following day. The author further states that all forms of communication of the club seem to have been monitored and/or interfered with, including the closing of the group’s webpage and hacking of the administrator’s password by the Egyptian authorities, who are well aware of the author’s identity and role as the information technology and communication manager of the club. He maintains that the Government of Egypt considered all expressions of opposition and dissent as acts of terror, linking those to the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. 2.6 The author explains that the Board wrongly concluded that he was only “at risk” if returned to Egypt but not at “high risk”. In this regard, he explains that he applied for asylum when the Muslim Brotherhood began to kill and target journalists and Facebook account administrators who were against their regime, as well as supporters of Hamdeen Sabahy from the Al-Karama opposition party. He notes that, at that time, some administrators of fan club webpages with a far more limited audience than that of the author were killed. Thus, he was already at high risk when he applied for asylum. Since then, the new military regime has enacted new legislation granting the authorities full power and the ability to arrest anyone for any reason. Thus, the author is still at high risk because of his capacity to reach and mobilize a large number of people for political reasons against the authorities through the Internet, as demonstrated by his intense activity on political and social media during the revolution. 2.7 The author stresses that, following the Board’s negative decision with regard to his asylum application, he published on 17 December 2013 on his Facebook page that he would return to Egypt shortly. Immediately afterwards, the police went to the house of the author’s mother to look for him and returned five more times thereafter, despite the fact that the author had no previous police, judicial or other official records. During one of the visits, the author’s mother was attacked and received a death threat from a police officer for taking 2 3 4 5 4 At that time, the transitional government established by the Army was in power (from February 2011 to June 2012). The author states that some officers took part in the massacre. On 26 January 2013, 21 persons were sentenced to death in connection with this event. Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood was President of Egypt from June 2012 to July 2013. The author does not specify the circumstances.