A/71/298 corruption and by providing for adequate selection, training and remuneration of law enforcement and judicial personnel (see Human Rights Council resolution 31/31). Such steps are indispensable to bringing about positive changes in the institutional culture and the mindset of law enforcement and other officials. 31. The protocol must apply to interviews conducted by law enforcement and other investigative bodies such as intelligence and military services and administrative bodies, during counter-terrorism operations and in situations of armed conflict, including extraterritorially. In this regard, the Special Ra pporteur is concerned that in some jurisdictions intelligence services have been empowered to apprehend, detain and question persons in connection with national security offences, as a way to circumvent legal and procedural safeguards applicable to traditional law enforcement agencies — a practice that has at times lamentably enabled the perpetration of egregious acts of torture and ill -treatment. The protocol should emphasize that there are no legitimate reasons for granting intelligence agencies such powers duplicating those held by traditional law enforcement bodies. Intelligence agencies mandated by law to exercise such powers must comply fully with international human rights standards, including those pertaining to the rights to liberty, fair trial, the use of torture-tainted information and the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment (see A/HRC/10/3; A/HRC/14/46; and European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan v. Turkey). Intelligence services entrusted with police powers must comply with rules applicable to the conduct of interviews in the criminal justice system. The above rationale also applies where military services or other investigative bodies are entrusted with police powers in the national law enforcement context. 32. The Special Rapporteur is concerned by the deprivation of liberty of persons for the sole purpose of questioning, a practice that entails severe risks of torture and ill-treatment. Law enforcement, military and intelligence agencies cannot be permitted to detain persons without probable cause and for the sole purpose of gathering information or intelligence, including in armed conflict (see A/HRC/14/46 and A/HRC/10/3). The apprehension and detention of individuals in the absence of reasonable suspicion that they have committed or are about to commit a criminal offence, or of other internationally accepted lawful grounds for detention, are prohibited. Administrative detention outside armed conflict is prohibited save the “most exceptional circumstances”; when justified by a “present, direct and imperative threat” that cannot be addressed by alternative measures, it must be accompanied by adequate safeguards, last no longer than “absolutely necessary” and be subject to prompt and regular review. When authorized, administrative detention must be ordered, implemented and supervised by judicial authorities. Standards and procedural safeguards applicable to interviews of suspects in the criminal justice systems must equally and unambiguously apply, as a matter of law and policy, to the questioning of persons held in administrative or preventive detention outsi de of armed conflict (see Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person (article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); and A/56/156). 33. The protection offered by international human rights law remains applicable during armed conflict and supplements that offered by international humanitarian 16-13568 9/25