CCPR/C/122/D/2265/2013 they have failed to register a first information report with the police or lodge a complaint under the 1996 Compensation Relating to Torture Act, and that the case should be addressed by the transitional justice mechanisms established in conformity with the Interim Constitution of 2007. The Committee also notes the authors’ arguments that, because such reports are filed only for the crimes listed in schedule 1 of the State Cases Act of 1992, which does not include enforced disappearance or torture, filing a first information report is not an appropriate means of seeking a remedy, that the Compensation Relating to Torture Act does not provide for criminal accountability, that statutory limitations prevented the authors from availing themselves of the mechanism established under the Act and that transitional justice mechanisms do not replace access to justice and cannot be considered an effective remedy to be exhausted. The Committee observes that Ms. Sharma attempted to file a complaint with the Kathmandu District Police Office but that the latter refused to register it. The Committee further notes that on 29 October 2003, Ms. Sharma filed a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court that did not shed light on her husband’s whereabouts. On 4 February 2005, Mr. Sharma’s lawyer also submitted a petition to the Supreme Court, requesting an investigation into his client’s disappearance. In its jurisprudence, the Committee has expressed the view that in cases of serious human rights violations such as torture or enforced disappearance, a judicial remedy is required. 16 In this respect, the Committee observes that the transitional justice bodies established by the Act on the Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation, 2071 (2014), are not judicial organs.17 With regard to the remedy under the Compensation Relating to Torture Act 1996, the Committee observes that, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1, of the Act, claims for compensation must be submitted within 35 days of the occurrence of torture or the detainee’s release. The Committee considers that, because of the 35-day period of limitation for bringing claims of torture under the Act, a period whose brevity is flagrantly inconsistent with the gravity of the crime, this remedy was not available to the authors.18 The Committee also notes that the authors have made several fruitless attempts to report the violations of their rights, including to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the authors have exhausted all available domestic remedies and that there are no obstacles to the examination of the communication under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 9.4 The Committee notes the State party’s observations that the authors’ allegations have not been substantiated. For the purposes of admissibility, however, the Committee considers that the authors have sufficiently substantiated their allegations with plausible supporting arguments. As all admissibility requirements have been met, the Committee declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 10.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 10.2 The Committee takes note of the authors’ allegations that Mr. Sharma was subjected to an enforced disappearance from 21 October 2003 to 8 March 2005. The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the authors’ allegations have not been substantiated and that Mr. Sharma was arrested only on 14 February 2005, under section 9 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance. 10.3 The Committee notes that it has dealt with numerous similar cases, some of them involving the State party. In line with these precedents, the Committee reaffirms that the burden of proof cannot rest solely on the authors of the communication, especially considering that the authors and the State party do not always have equal access to evidence and that frequently the State party alone has access to the relevant information. 19 It is 16 17 18 19 See Giri et al. v. Nepal (CCPR/C/101/D/1761/2008), para. 6.3. See Tharu et al. v. Nepal (CCPR/C/114/D/2038/2011), para. 9.3. See Maharjan et al. v. Nepal (CCPR/C/105/D/1863/2009), para. 7.6. See El Hassy and El Hassy v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (CCPR/C/91/D/1422/2005), para. 6.7; Medjnoune v. Algeria (CCPR/C/87/D/1297/2004), para. 8.3; Il Khwildy and Il Khwildy v. Libya (CCPR/C/106/D/1804/2008), para. 7.2; and Tripathi et al. v. Nepal (CCPR/C/112/D/2111/2011), para. 7.2. 11