CAT/C/64/D/810/2017 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether Mr. Gharsallah’s extradition to Tunisia would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee recalls that the prohibition of torture is absolute and non-derogable and that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State party to justify acts of torture.26 8.3 In assessing whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the alleged victim would be in danger of being subjected to torture, the Committee recalls that, under article 3 (2) of the Convention, States parties must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the requesting State. However, the aim of such an analysis is to determine whether Mr. Gharsallah runs a personal risk of being subjected to torture if he is extradited to Tunisia. The existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on extradition to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.27 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.28 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group which may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee’s practice in this context has been to determine that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”.29 Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: the complainant’s ethnic background; previous torture; incommunicado detention or other form of arbitrary and illegal detention in the country of origin; and clandestine escape from the country of origin for threats of torture. 30 The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned; however, it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment of the information available to it in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, taking into account all the circumstances relevant to each case. 31 8.5 The Committee must take the current human rights situation in Tunisia into account and recalls, in this connection, its concluding observations on the third periodic report of Tunisia, in which the Committee expressed concern about reports that confessions made under torture have been admitted as evidence in court in the absence of any investigation into the torture allegations 32 and about consistent reports that torture continues to be practised in the security sector.33 However, the assessment of the risk of being subjected to torture cannot be based exclusively on the general situation in Tunisia; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the alleged victim would be personally exposed to danger. 8.6 The Committee notes the complainant’s allegation that Mr. Gharsallah’s extradition to Tunisia would put him at substantial risk of torture because he belonged to the political party of former President Ben Ali. The Committee also notes the State party’s observation that the Moroccan courts, during the domestic proceedings, did not identify any risk that Mr. 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 8 See the Committee’s general comment No. 2 (2007) on the implementation of article 2 by States parties, para. 5. See Alhaj Ali v. Morocco (CAT/C/58/D/682/2015), para. 8.3; R.A.Y. v. Morocco, para. 7.2; and Mugesera v. Canada (CAT/C/63/D/488/2012), para. 11.3. See Kalinichenko v. Morocco, para. 15.3. See general comment No. 4, para. 11. Ibid., para. 45. Ibid., para. 50. See CAT/C/TUN/CO/3, para. 23. Ibid., para. 15. GE.18-15280