CCPR/C/119/D/2338/2014 this connection, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol have been met. 6.4 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists.36 The Committee further recalls its jurisprudence that considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party, 37 and that it is generally for organs of States parties to the Covenant to review or evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 38 6.5 In the present case, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author made incoherent and inconsistent statements during asylum proceedings, that the Refugee Appeals Board made a comprehensive and thorough examination of the evidence submitted by him, that he is trying to use the Committee as an appellate body to have the factual circumstances of his asylum application reassessed, and that he has failed to establish a prima facie case for admissibility purposes regarding the alleged violation of articles 6, 7 and 18 of the Covenant. 6.6 The Committee observes that the author has not identified any irregularities in the decision-making process, nor any risk factor that the State party’s authorities failed to take properly into account. It considers that while the author disagrees with the factual conclusions of the State party’s authorities, he has not shown that they were clearly arbitrary or manifestly erroneous or amounted to a denial of justice. 6.7 The Committee observes that the author’s original request for asylum on the grounds of his fear of persecution by the Afghan authorities and by private individuals — his spouse’s family and A.K. — based on the allegations of the rape and kidnapping of his wife was rejected by the Danish Immigration Service and the Refugee Appeals Board because he had failed to establish that he would face any risk to his life or of being subjected to torture if returned to Afghanistan. The Committee notes that on 1 October 2013, the author requested the Board to reopen his case on the grounds that he converted to Christianity, and that the Board rejected this request on 30 October 2013 because he did not adequately explain why he had decided to convert to Christianity immediately prior to his removal to Afghanistan. The Committee also notes that on 9 December 2013, the Board decided to reopen the author’s case, giving him the opportunity to substantiate his new allegations and submit evidence in their support. It further notes that on 16 January 2014, the Board dismissed the author’s new allegations because it considered that his conversion to Christianity was not genuine, as he had not mentioned his interest in any religion until his original asylum claim was rejected on 31 January 2013. In addition, the Board considered that the author had failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why he had decided to get baptised. The Committee observes that the author’s claims mainly rely on his activities in a Christian church, which only started after his original asylum claim had been rejected. In the light of the above, the Committee considers that the author’s claims under articles 6, 7 and 18 of the Covenant have been insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, and concludes that this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.8 The Committee further notes the author’s claims under articles 26 of the Covenant that the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board and its procedure constitute discrimination 36 37 38 See, for example, communication No. 2007/2010, X. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 9.2. See, for example, communications No. 2344/2014, E.P. and F.P. v. Denmark, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 2 November 2015, para. 8.4, and No. 1957/2010, Lin v. Australia, Views adopted on 21 March 2013, para. 9.3. See, for example, E.P. and F.P. v. Denmark, para. 8.4. 9