10 ANNUAL REPORT 2011 of the system they were intended to monitor. The courts were another option, but for many people a lawsuit was – and still is – a lengthy and costly affair. An alternative was needed to meet the individual citizen’s need for an independent, free and easily accessible appeal body. At the same time, the legislature itself needed an institution able to monitor the administration’s use of the rules that had been passed. The solution was the Parliamentary Ombudsman. The Ombudsman institution was included in the Constitution of 1953 and established in 1955. The model was the Swedish ombudsman system, which was established already in 1809, but the Danish model differed from the Swedish in important respects. To a large extent, it is the Danish model which subsequently spread to other countries, with the result that the word ‘ombudsman’ is today known in several continents. At times, the Ombudsman is called ‘the common man’s advocate’. This ex­press­ es something very important in that the Ombudsman fundamentally exists for the ordinary citizen and the principal mission of the Ombudsman is to en­sure that the individual does not have his or her rights infringed or is exposed to unfair treatment by public authorities. It is not, however, the Ombudsman’s role to take the citizen’s part in the way that a lawyer must take a client’s part. The Ombudsman’s role is to assess soberly and objectively whether the administration has treated the individual citizen in accordance with applicable law and good administrative practice. Another characteristic is that the Ombudsman cannot make binding decisions in relation to the administration, but only express an opinion and, if appropriate, recommend that the authorities reopen the relevant case. It may sound fragile and in a way it is, but it cannot easily be otherwise. In principle, the Ombudsman’s authority covers all activities of the public administration and if he could make binding decisions, exceptional power would be concentrated in a single institution. This is unlikely to be desired by anyone, including the Om­ budsman. In reality, a fine balance is maintained by the Ombudsman on the one hand having the power to investigate any case in the entire public administration and on the other being unable to enforce his legal conception. As a result, Ombudsman and authorities have to establish suitable checks and balances in relation to each other. In addition, the Ombudsman’s legal conception is in practice virtually always followed. This is of course connected with the strong mandate held by the Om-