40 See, for example, E/CN.4/2002/18, annex, para. 4 (d); Council of Europe, Guidelines…, Guideline III (para. 2); and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Report on terrorism and human rights” (paras. 51 and 55). 41 See, for example, the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada to this effect: Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union [1991] 2 SCR 211 and Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) [2003] 1 SCR 912. 42 For a discussion on each of these factors, see further Alex Conte, “The ICT project on human rights compliance when countering terrorism: a guide to legislators, policy-makers and the judiciary”, in ISC 2005: Security, Terrorism and Privacy in Information Society, K. von Knop and others, eds. (2006). 43 See, for example, “Australia: study on human rights compliance while countering terrorism” (A/HCR/4/26/Add.3); “Report of the independent expert on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Robert K. Goldman” (E/CN.4/2005/103, paras. 8, 9 and 74); Human Rights Committee, general comment  N° 29, paras. 4–5; E/CN.4/2002/18, annex, paras. 4 (b), (e)–(g); Council of Europe,  Guidelines…, Guideline III (para. 2); and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Report on terrorism and human rights” (para. 51). 44 See, for example, Canadian jurisprudence, in particular R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 and R. v. Lucas [1998] 1 SCR 439, para. 118. 45 See also article 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The African Charter does not contain a derogation clause. According to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, limitations on the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot therefore be justified by emergencies or special circumstances. “The only legitimate reasons for limiting the rights and freedoms of the African Charter are found in article 27 (2), that is, that the rights of the Charter ‘shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’ In addition, the justification of limitations must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which follow. Most important, a limitation may not erode a right such that the right itself becomes illusory” (Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, communications N° 140/94, N° 141/94, N° 145/95, paras. 41–42). 46 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 on habeas corpus in emergency situations, 30 January 1987 (paras. 42–43). 47 Interpreting the comparable derogation provision within the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Court of Human Rights has spoken of four criteria to establish that any given situation amounts to “a time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”. First, it should be a crisis or emergency that is actual or imminent. Second, it must be exceptional, so that “normal” measures are inadequate. Next, the emergency must threaten the continuance of the organized life of the community. Finally, it must affect the population of the State taking measures. On this fourth point, early decisions of the Court spoke of an emergency needing to affect the whole population. The Court appears to have subsequently accepted that an emergency threatening the life of the nation might only materially affect one part of the nation at the time of the emergency.  See Lawless v. Ireland (No 3), N° 332/57, Judgement of 1 July 1961, para. 28. See also Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, N° 14553/89; N° 14554/89, Judgement of  25 May 1993, contrast with the dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh, para. 2. 48 See A/58/40 (vol. I), para. 85 (15). 51