49 See “Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston” (E/CN.4/2006/53, paras. 44–54) and “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin” (A/HRC/4/26, paras. 74–78). 50 See address by High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, “A human rights framework for fighting terrorism”, Moscow State University/University of International Relations, 11 February 2005. 51 E/CN.4/2006/53, paras. 45 and 51. 52 Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 6) and the American Convention on Human Rights (art. 4) prohibit the arbitrary deprivation of life, whereas article 2 of the European Convention states that no one shall be deprived of life intentionally and that the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary may be used in defence of any person from unlawful violence. See also Human Rights Committee, views on communication N° 146/1983, Baboeram v. Suriname, 4 April 1985: “The right enshrined in this article is the supreme right of the human being. It follows that the deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity. This follows from the article as a whole and in particular is the reason why paragraph 2 of the article lays down that the death penalty may be imposed only for the most serious crimes. The requirements that the right shall be protected by law and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life mean that the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by the authorities of a State” (A/40/40, annex X, para. 14.3). 53 See Human Rights Committee, general comment N° 6 (1982). See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Report on terrorism and human rights” (paras. 87 and 89), citing Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru, Judgement of 19 January 1995 (paras. 74–75). 54 See Human Rights Committee, views on communication N° 45/1979, Suárez de Guerrero v. Colombia, 31 March 1982 (A/37/40, annex XI, paras. 12.2, 13.1–13.3). See also the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1), the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (General Assembly resolution 34/169) and the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/65). 55 See E/CN.4/2006/53, para. 48. On the strict requirements regarding the use of force under the European Convention on Human Rights, see, inter alia, European Court of Human Rights, McCann v. United Kingdom, N° 18984/91, Judgement of 27 September 1995. 56 See, for example, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, para. 144. 57 See articles 7 and 4 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, articles 3 and 15 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, articles 5 and 27 (2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions. See also InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, “Report on the situation of human rights of asylum seekers within the Canadian refugee determination system” (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 40 rev., para. 118). 58 See Committee against Torture, views on communication N° 39/1996, Tapia Páez v. Sweden, 28 April 1997: “[T]he test of article 3 of the Convention is absolute. Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to another State, the State party is under obligation not to return the person concerned to that State. The nature of the activities in which the person 52