CAT/C/63/D/703/2015 I.U.K. was subjected to abuse. The State party refers in this respect to the Committee’s decision in S.A.P. et al. v. Switzerland.22 6.3 The State party noted the Committee’s decision in M.B. et al. v. Denmark,23 in which it stated, inter alia, that the impartial and independent assessment of whether the reason for the inconsistences in the first complainant’s statements might be that he had been subjected to torture could have been made by the Board only after having ordered the first complainant’s examination for signs of torture. The State party submits that it disagrees with the view expressed by the Committee in that decision and finds that the circumstances that an asylum seeker may request an examination for signs of torture does not in itself lead to an absolute obligation on the part of the immigration authorities to initiate such an examination, not even in cases in which an asylum seeker has produced medical information indicating that he or she might have been subjected to torture. It maintains that the issue of whether to initiate an examination must be determined on the basis of an individual assessment, including an assessment of whether the outcome of the examination must be deemed to be of significance to the Board’s decision. Finally, the State party observes that the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention does not imply either that there is an obligation to initiate an examination for signs of torture for the mere reason that an asylum seeker claims to have been subjected to torture. The State party also recalls that, when exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to article 3 of the Convention, the Committee should give considerable weight to the findings of fact made by the organs of the State party concerned. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 7.1 Before considering any claim submitted in a communication, the Committee must decide whether it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22 (5) (a) of the Convention, that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 7.2 The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, it shall not consider any complaint from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has not contested that the complainants have exhausted all available domestic remedies.24 The Committee therefore finds that it is not precluded from considering the communication under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention. 7.3 The Committee recalls that, for a claim to be admissible under article 22 of the Convention and rule 113 (b) of its rules of procedure, it must rise to the basic level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility. 25 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the complaint is manifestly unfounded owing to a lack of substantiation. The Committee considers, however, that the arguments put forward by the complainants raise substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention and that those arguments should be dealt with on the merits. Accordingly, the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, declares the complaint admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainants to the Russian Federation would constitute a violation of the State party’s 22 23 24 25 10 See S.A.P. et al. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/56/D/565/2013), para. 7.4. See, M.B. et al. v. Denmark, para. 9.6. See, for example, X.Q.L. v. Australia (CAT/C/52/D/455/2011), para. 8.2. See, for example, K.A. v. Sweden (CAT/C/39/D/308/2006), para. 7.2.