CCPR/C/116/D/2314/2013 documentation to support his claims, and that he could not file a pre-removal risk assessment application owing to statutory time limitation restrictions. State party’s observations on admissibility and merits 4.1 On 19 December 2014, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and merits of the communication. It considers that the communication should be declared inadmissible because: (a) the author has failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies; (b) his allegation that his removal to Sri Lanka would violate article 9 (1) of the Covenant is incompatible with the scope of this provision, in contravention of article 3 of the Optional Protocol and rule 96 (d) of the Committee’s rules of procedure; (c) the author’s allegations under two international instruments other than the Covenant are incompatible with article 3 of the Optional Protocol and rule 96 (d); and (d) the author’s claims are ill founded. The State party also considers that it is generally for domestic authorities to evaluate facts and evidence and indicates that the author has not provided any evidence to the Committee that has not been provided to the Canadian authorities during the asylum proceedings. 4.2 The State party considers that the author has not exhausted domestic remedies, as he did not apply for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, despite the fact it became available to the author on 12 February 2014. The State party submits that humanitarian and compassionate grounds is an effective remedy that offers a reasonable prospect of redress, as it is a broad and discretionary review by a decision-maker who can determine whether a person can be granted permanent residence in cases where the applicant would suffer unusual and undeserved hardship because of the need to apply for a permanent visa outside Canada. These decisions are reviewable, with leave, by the Federal Court. The State party indicates that the author could have used this recourse to demonstrate his family ties in Canada — he has an uncle there —, and to describe hardships he could experience if removed to Sri Lanka.19 The State party indicates that, although the humanitarian and compassionate grounds would not lead to an automatic stay of removal, the author could apply to the Federal Court for a judicial stay of removal pending the outcome of the assessment of his request.20 The State party regrets the Views recently adopted by the Committee, in which the Committee has considered that applications made on humanitarian and compassionate grounds are not remedies that should be exhausted for admissibility purposes.21 4.3 The State party submits that the author’s claim that article 9 (1) of the Covenant would be violated if he is removed to Sri Lanka is inadmissible, as it is incompatible with the article’s scope. It argues that article 9 (1) does not impose an obligation on States to refrain from removing individuals who face a real risk of arbitrary detention in the receiving State. Therefore, even if the author demonstrates that he would be subjected to detention contrary to article 9 (1) in Sri Lanka — which is denied —, the responsibility of 19 20 21 The State Party indicates that, following a legislative reform in 2010, applications made on humanitarian and compassionate grounds are no longer based on the kinds of risks that are already assessed within the Immigration Refugee Board and pre-removal risk assessment processes. See the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, section 25 (1.3). The State Party quotes communication No. 1578/2007, Dastgir v. Canada, Views adopted on 30 October 2008, in which the Committee considered that an application made on humanitarian and compassionate grounds was among the domestic remedies available to bring effective relief to the authors. The State party cites, among others, communication No. 1959/2010, Warsame v. Canada, Views adopted on 21 July 2011, and Committee against Torture communication No. 520/2012, W.G.D. v. Canada, decision adopted on 26 November 2014. 7