evidence given by him during the trial or to otherwise undermine his credibility. Where the credibility of an accused must be assessed by a jury the use of such testimony may be especially harmful.20 The case of A.T. v. Luxembourg is an example of denials of an offence within criminal proceedings (specifically, in police questioning) being used in this way to show the accused was telling different versions of his story and to undermine his credibility. What still remains to be clarified is the extent to which it may also apply to evidence (eg. from an identity parade), where there is no communicative information from the suspect at all. This may, again, be an area where the Directive has more to offer than the existing ECtHR case-law. c. ‘Used for a conviction’ As established above, the violation of Article 6 arises only where the incriminating statement obtained in the absence of a lawyer is ‘used for a conviction’. This is, sadly, an area where there is ambiguity in the case-law which, eight years after Salduz, is still unresolved. Fair Trials has put forward an assessment of the case-law in this area.21 There may be other readings of the case-law, but the different approaches identified were the following:22   Incriminating statements may not ‘have a bearing’ upon the merits decision. All effects of the defence rights infringement had to be ‘completely undone’ In this area, there is scope for argument both under the existing ECtHR case-law and the Directive and it remains to be settled whether an incriminating statement obtained without a lawyer can, in any circumstances, be used for a conviction in some way without infringing Article 6. C. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE For simplicity, we will not dwell upon the numerous recitals in the preamble to the Directive. For the purposes of our general approach, it is sufficient to consider part of the content of Article 3, which sets out a rule articulating the Salduz right to legal assistance as from initial questioning: ‘2. Suspects or accused persons shall have access to a lawyer without undue delay. In any event, suspects or accused persons shall have access to a lawyer from whichever of the following points in time is the earliest: (a) before they are questioned by the police or by another law enforcement or judicial authority; (…) 20 Saunders v. United Kingdom App. No 19187/91 (Judgment of 17 December 1996). See Fair Trials’ intervention in A.T. v. Luxembourg, March 2014, available at https://www.fairtrials.org/wpcontent/uploads/AT-v-LUX-Intervention.pdf. 22 A third approach suggested that evidence obtained in breach of Article 6(3)(c) could be used if it were not the central platform amid a complex of evidence. The relevant Chamber judgment (Dvorski v. Croatia App. No 25703/11 (Judgment (First Section) of 28 November 2013), which Fair Trials criticised, was reversed by the Grand Chamber (see Dvorski v. Croatia App. No 25703/11 (Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 20 October 2015). 21 12